Metaphysics

This paper was accepted for the Joint Session Would love to have comments as it is condensed draft of a chap. of my book in progress:"On contradiction."

A Disturbing Model in Met. Iota Abstract. Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that all things are contraries or composed from the contraries of the genos of which they are members. Those contraries are the " one " (to hen) and its privation: in colours, white and black. Aristotle speaks of a process of alteration of " the changing thing " from one contrary to the other, metamorphosing successively into each intermediate between. Members of a genos can be assigned, and ordered by, a " number, " which I argue represents the proportions of the contraries of which they are composed. With his model, Aristotle accounts for all members of a genos with the forms of the two contraries. Aristotle says that the sort of analysis that he applies to colours and other genē must also apply to substance. A mathematical representation of Aristotle's theory is presented, and objections are considered and laid to rest.

Analyzing the position of two philosophers whose views are recognizably divergent, W. O. Quine and M. Dummett, we intend to support a striking point of agreement between them: the idea that our logical principles constitute our principles about what there is, and therefore, that logic is metaphysics.

There is a close systematic relationship between panentheism, as a metaphysical theory about the relation between God and the world, and transhumanism, the ethical demand to use the means of the applied sciences to enhance both human nature and the environment. This relationship between panentheism and transhumanism provides a ‘cosmic’ solution to the problem of evil: on panentheistic premises, the history of the world is the one infinite life of God, and we are part of the one infinite divine being. We ourselves are therefore responsible for the future development of the life of the divine being. We should therefore use the means provided by the natural sciences to develop the history of the world in such a way that the existence of evil shall be overcome and shall no longer be part of the divine being in whom we move and live and have our being. The metaphysics of panentheism leads to the ethics of transhumanism.

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

Catharine Trotter Cockburn is best known for her _Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding_ (1702). However very little has been said about Trotter’s treatment of Locke’s metaphysical commitments therein. In this paper I give a brief description of the history of Trotter’s _Defence_. Thereafter I focus on two (of the many) objections to which Trotter responds on Locke’s behalf: 1) the objection that Locke has not proved the soul immortal, and 2) the objection that Locke’s view leads to the absurd consequence that our souls are in constant flux. I argue that Trotter offers a compelling response to both of these charges. This is not only because of what Trotter explicitly claims in the _Defence_, but also because the _Defence_ invites and encourages the reader to return to Locke’s text. I then argue that in Trotter we find additional insights and clarifications once we move past the two objections I just mentioned, and on to the related topic of personal identity.  In this short paper I am not able to offer a full explication or evaluation of Trotter’s treatment of Locke’s metaphysical commitments. I am, however, able to show that this aspect of Trotter’s _Defence_ warrants careful consideration and further study.

One of the most persistent and poignant human experiences is the sensation of longing—a restlessness perhaps best described as the unspoken conviction that something is missing from our lives. In this study, Drew M. Dalton attempts to illuminate this experience by examining the philosophical thought of Emmanuel Levinas on longing, or what Levinas terms “metaphysical desire.”

Metaphysical desire, according to Levinas, does not stem from any determinate lack within us, nor does it aim at a particular object beyond us, much less promise any eventual satisfaction. Rather, it functions in the realm of the infinite where such distinctions as inside and outside or one and the other are indistinguishable, perhaps even eliminated. As Levinas conceives such longing, it becomes a mediator in our relation to the other—both the human other and the divine Other.

Dalton follows the meandering trail of Levinas’s thought along a series of dialogues with some of the philosophers within the history of the Western tradition who have most influenced his corpus. By tracing the genealogy of Levinas’s notion of metaphysical desire—namely in the works of Plato, Heidegger, Fichte, Schelling, and Otto—the nature of this Levinasian theme is elucidated to reveal that it is not simply an idealism, a “hagiography of desire” detached from actual experience and resulting in a disconnect between his phenomenological account and our own lives. Rather, Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire points to a phenomenology of human longing that is both an ethical and religious phenomenon. In the end, human longing is revealed to be one of the most profound ways in which a subject becomes a subject, arising to its “true self,” and hearing the call to responsibility placed upon it by the Other.

Throughout, Dalton explicates the nuance of a number of key Levinasian terms, many of which have been taken from the Western philosophical tradition and reinscribed with a new meaning. Eros, the “Good beyond being,” shame, responsibility, creation, the trace, the il y a, and the holy are discovered to be deeply tied to Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire, resulting in a conclusion regarding longing’s role in the relationship between the finite and the Infinite.

This paper provides an initial, multidimensional map of the complex relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world in a way that follows both the contours of everyday experience and the findings of science. It then demonstrates how this reflexive monist map can be used to evaluate the utility and resolve some of the oppositions of the many other “isms” that currently populate consciousness studies. While no conventional, one-dimensional “ism” such as physicalism can do justice to this web of relationships, physicalism, functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, and dual-aspect monism can all be seen to provide useful ways of understanding different aspects of the relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world when these are viewed in either a first- or a third-person way from within this web of relationships by sentient creatures such as ourselves. For example, physicalism and functionalism provide a useful understanding of consciousness, mind, brain and external world when viewed from a third-person perspective, while neutral monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of external phenomena. On the other hand, dual-aspect monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of mind, including Eastern versus Western views of mind.  Dual-aspect monism also provides a useful understanding of the “unconscious ground of being” that gives rise to, supports and embeds all these observable phenomena. For an integrated understanding one needs to understand how these phenomena and relationships combine into an integrated whole.

Drawing upon John Burnet’s interpretation of mesotēs, I explore the original meanings of this important Greek word and its inherent relations to the concepts of formal cause, final cause, and actuality [energeia]. My investigation reveals the concept of mesotēs as an Ariadne’s thread running through the whole system of Aristotle’s moral and natural philosophy. It also throws a new light on the implications of Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue and the essential role it plays in the truth of human existence.

Диссертация посвящена одной из самых запутанных и старых философских проблем - проблеме ментальной каузальности или проблеме взаимодействия сознания и тела. Все мы убеждены, что состояния сознания влияют на поведение, а также знаем (и все больше узнаем) о корреляции между сознательными и нейронными состояния, что какие-то процессы в мозге обязательным образом сопряжены с наличием сознания. Однако при всех этих данных до сих пор неясно КАК сознание связано с процессами в мозге, где пролегает путь от области ментального к физическому миру. На данный момент есть несколько конкурирующих гипотез на этот счет и выбор одной из них во многом определит теорию сознания.

El presente texto es el prólogo para mi traducción de Q. Meillassoux, "Metafísica y ficción extracientífica" (Santiago: Roneo, 2020), que co-escribimos M. Ramírez y yo. Contiene una explicación general del 'realismo especulativo' y el rol que el filósofo Q. Meillassoux juega en él, a partir de su propuesta de 'materialismo especulativo' y la crítica a la noción de 'correlacionismo' allí implicada. Luego, el prólogo entrega indicaciones sobre la relación entre metafísica y ficción propuesta por el autor.

The concept of antinatalism is now becoming popular on the Internet. Many online newspaper articles deal with this topic, and numerous academic papers on antinatalism have been published over the past ten years in the fields of philosophy and ethics.  The word “antinatalism” was first used in the current meaning in 2006, when the two books that justify the universal negation of procreation were published: one by David Benatar and the other by Théophile de Giraud. However, we can find various prototypes of antinatalistic thoughts in ancient Greece, ancient India, and modern Europe. You might recall the name Schopenhauer.
In this paper, I briefly summarize the history of antinatalistic thoughts and propose a set of categories on antinatalism and related thoughts.

"Michel Weber et Pierfrancesco Basile (sous la direction de), Chromatikon III. Annuaire de la philosophie en procès — Yearbook of Philosophy in Process, Louvain-la-Neuve, Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2007. (300 p. ; ISBN 978-2-8746-3083-5 ; 23 € ; http://www.i6doc.com/fr/livre/?GCOI=28001100028210 ; http://www.i6doc.com/en/livre/?GCOI=28001100028210; http://www.i6doc.com/doc/chromatikon3 & http://www.i6doc.com/doc/chromatikon3-eng)

Table
Michel Weber, Avant-Propos & Foreword
I. Séminaires de recherche — Research Seminars
Pierfrancesco Basile, The Reality of Forms
Jean-Marie Breuvart, Husserl et Whitehead, sur l’Intentionnalité
Didier Debaise, Life and Orders
Ronny Desmet, The Rebirth of the Ether
Guillaume Durand, Les objets perceptuels du Professeur Whitehead
Franck Robert, Penser la couleur avec Process and Reality
Xavier Verley, Sentir : Whitehead et Merleau-Ponty
II. Etudes critiques — Critical Studies
Jean-Pascal Alcantara, Le rôle des mathématiques dans la genèse whiteheadienne
Une Sœur de Saint-Jean, Un Principe que les religions appellent « Dieu »
Laura Ilinescu, Vérité et pouvoir dans le Léviathan de Thomas Hobbes
Marc Maesschalck, Raison et événement chez Jean Ladrière
Pierre Montebello, Nietzsche, une philosophie de la nature
Michel Weber, Contact Made Vision: The Apocryphal Whitehead
III. Comptes rendus — Critical Reviews
Stéphan Galetic : James, Essais d’empirisme radical
Ronny Desmet : Lacoste Lareymondie, Une philosophie pour la physique quantique
IV. Informations réticulaires — Reticular News
Discussion: David Ray Griffin, A Reply to Alexander Cockburn
Notes : Peter H. Hare, On Gertrude Stein and Mathematical Logic
Interview : Carlo Sini, Luca Gaeta and Luca Vanzago, The Milano School
Tribute: Leemon McHenry, T.L.S. Sprigge, the Last Idealist
Séminaires — Seminars
Publications
Table des matières — Table of Contents
"

Nossa proposta é investigar como ocorrem as metamorfoses da noção de substância simples no sistema leibniziano, entre Discurso de metafísica, Sistema novo da natureza e a comunicação das substâncias e Monadologia. Trata-se da mesma substância ou são noções diferentes?
Partimos de aporias de sua época e a polêmica entre os métodos modernos e escolásticos. Apontamos as críticas de Leibniz a ambos, partindo das insuficiências modernas aos excessos escolásticos, passando, assim, do campo da física ao campo lógico, em vista das questões metafísicas. Apoiando-se na exposição lógica, acabamos tentando reconstruir, involuntariamente, todo o sistema a partir do princípio de identidade, para conseguir apontar com mais clareza as inovações de Leibniz que reconciliam os dois partidos em sua síntese original.
Ao final, fazemos breves apontamentos particulares sobre cada um dos três textos e tiramos nossas conclusões, se as diferentes expressões da substância simples, nossa questão motriz.

Quentin Meillassoux, "Metafísica y ficción extracientífica, seguido de "La bola de billar" de I. Asimov. Santiago: Roneo, 2020. Traducción y notas de Meillassoux por Jean-Paul Grasset B. Prólogo de Jean-Paul Grasset B. y Mario Teodoro Ramírez.
Traducción de 'La bola de billar" por Cristóbal Carrasco y Nicolás Vargas.

This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at the heart of that problem, and by building upon the hypothesis that the apparent problem is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical.
Chapter 1 introduces the problem. The key question is whether phenomenal consciousness is onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of it. There are powerful arguments for the Primitivist view that consciousness is independent of the physical. These arguments rest on the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. I propose that this apparent gap must be understood as a composite of two deeper conceptual gaps pertaining to the subjective character and qualitative character of consciousness respectively. The ‘–tivity gap’ claims that physical states are objective, phenomenal states are subjective and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ claims that physical properties are extrinsic (structural), that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic (non-structural) and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the intrinsic. After refining the case for Primitivism, I consider the compelling reasons for rejecting Primitivism in favour of Physicalism. The challenge posed by the Problem of Consciousness is to resolve this antinomy between Primitivism and Physicalism.
In Chapter 2 I consider standard responses to the problem. The failings of these positions lead me to introduce three criteria that an adequate response must satisfy. I reject the view that Primitivism can be salvaged, and hold that a satisfactory response to the problem must protect Physicalism. I reject standard ‘Type-A’ responses according to which there is no epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and argue that a satisfactory response cannot deny the manifest reality of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, I reject ‘Type-B’ responses according to which the epistemic gap does not entail ontic distinctness. I hold that if Physicalism is true, the entailment from the physical facts to the phenomenal facts must be knowable a priori for an epistemically ideal subject.
Chapter 3 evaluates a non-standard Type-A response to the Problem of Consciousness which promises to satisfy all three criteria. According to Stoljar’s Epistemic View (EV), consciousness only seems inexplicable in physical terms because we have a limited conception of the physical. I argue that EV should be supported iff two demanding challenges can be met: the Relevance Condition requires adequate reason to believe that unknown physical properties could address the –tivity gap and the –trinsicality gap. The Integration Condition requires adequate reason to believe that there is a specific blind-spot in our current conception of the physical that is plausibly occupied by properties that perform the requisite explanatory role. To satisfy these conditions, the advocate of EV must make positive claims about the content of our proposed ignorance.
In Chapter 4 I argue that EV stands or falls with the plausibility of the Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (RIH). According to RIH, we have no concepts of the intrinsic properties of physical entities, and those intrinsic properties are integral to the physical explanation of consciousness. I argue that we are indeed conceptually ignorant of intrinsic physical properties. I also argue that RIH meets the Integration Condition, and goes some way to satisfying the Relevance Condition. RIH plausibly undermines the –trinsicality gap by showing that some physical properties are intrinsic, though they are beyond our current conception. The apparent gap is then an illusion resulting from the fact that all known physical properties are extrinsic. RIH fails, however, to address the –tivity gap. I conclude that no version of EV can offer a full response to the Problem of Consciousness.
In Chapter 5 I explore an entirely different kind of response to the Problem of Consciousness. Representationalism claims that consciousness is explicable in terms of intentional properties, and that intentional properties are explicable in terms of physical properties. I argue that standard Representationalist proposals are unable to account for the qualitative character of conscious states, and diagnose this failure in terms of the –trinsicality gap. However, the prospects for a Representationalist account of subjective character are more promising. Specifically, Kriegel’s Self-Representationalism holds that a mental state is a phenomenal state in virtue of suitably representing itself. I argue that this proposal plausibly addresses the –tivity gap.
RIH and Self-Representationalism each deal with one of the two apparent conceptual gaps between the physical and the phenomenal, but not the other. In Chapter 6 I develop a hybrid proposal that combines the best of both positions. The ‘Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis’ (NRIH) claims that a mental state is a phenomenal state at all in virtue of suitably representing itself, and has its qualitative character in virtue of the intrinsic physical properties involved in its implementation. I expand this claim and defend it against a number of potential criticisms. I also explore the relationship between its two components, suggesting that they are each founded on a common epistemic insight. I argue that NRIH successfully addresses the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps and, moreover, that it provides a compelling account of why consciousness appears to be inexplicable in physical terms. I conclude that NRIH offers a powerful response to the Problem of Consciousness that successfully undermines the case for Primitivism. Furthermore, I conclude that NRIH has substantial advantages over competing attempted responses, and offers the best possible way of capitalising on the insights of EV and Representationalism.

Truth pluralism, as I understand it, is the view that there is more than one property propositions can possess that makes them true when they are lucky enough to be so. In this essay, I aim to clarify pluralism by
concentrating on three questions any pluralist theory of truth must answer:
􀁸 How do we identify the properties in virtue of which propositions
are true?
􀁸 How are those properties related to truth?
􀁸 What determines which of these properties a given proposition must
have in order to be true?

This paper appears in N. Pedersen and Wright, Truth and Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, presents the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology.

Some Endorsements for Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy:

“[Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy] is more than an anthology. It is a wisely crafted collection of classic and contemporary scholarship noting that what many are seeking is what has always been, a perennial philosophy, that remains foundational. As one of the authors, Tage Lindbom, properly notes, ‘Secularization is a fish in troubled waters.’ This book claims the waters and is essential reading for all those who may have forgotten or are simply ignorant of the rich foundation provided by the perennial philosophy.”
—Ralph W. Hood, Professor of Psychology at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, past president of the Psychology of Religion division of the American Psychological Association, co-founder of The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion and co-author of The Psychology of Religion

“A necessary and bracing critique of the assumptions and limitations of contemporary Western psychology, this generous volume is also a passionate call and learned guide towards a truer perspective that embraces man's spiritual nature.”
—Gabor Maté, M.D., and author of In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts: Close Encounters with Addiction

“Knowing the nature of the mind is perhaps the most difficult undertaking, especially in today’s world. To comprehend the nature of mind one needs to turn to the domain of religion and spirituality. Yet the truth of the mind and its complexity cannot explicitly be defined in words. Inner or transcendent wisdom sees the mind’s own nature without the duality of the seer. Suchness (tathatā) of mind is only experiential and not expressible. The words used to describe thought are themselves a product of thought, which is conditioned and limited. Thus, differences and contradictions are unavoidable. Therefore, a comparative study of different viewpoints and commentaries is immensely important to awaken the inner intelligence to see the mind as it is. Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy: Studies in Comparative Religion edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is an outstanding effort in this direction.”
—Samdhong Rinpoche, former Prime Minister (Kalon Tripa) of the Tibetan Government-in-exile, author of Uncompromising Truth for a Compromised World: Tibetan Buddhism and Today’s World

“The rise of psychology has impacted the study and practice of spirituality, the experiences and attitudes relevant to ultimate human values that transcend ordinary behavior. Each chapter of this remarkable book demonstrates this interaction in a unique and provocative way. But rather than using psychology to reduce and ‘psychologize’ spiritual topics, its authors demonstrate how directives from the spiritual traditions can enhance and even illuminate the enduring importance of psychology in the 21st century.”
—Stanley Krippner, Saybrook University, co-author of Spiritual Dimensions of Healing

“The work at hand is a thinking and debating man’s delight. If you have any interest at all in attempting to include an educated and enlightened view of man’s higher functions in your purview of the world, you will learn from and enjoy this collection of essays. If you already have some knowledge in this area, brace yourself: you may see some of your favorites sharply criticized. A thought-provoking work.”
—Bruce W. Scotton, University of California, San Francisco, co-editor of Textbook of Transpersonal Psychiatry and Psychology

“This book, superbly edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos, is a masterful critique of the field of psychology and its loss of the sacred ground in which it once was rooted. It offers depth psychologists an opportunity to contemplate timeless truths echoed through the centuries by perennial philosophers who have always claimed psyche is subordinate to Spirit. Although ignored in depth psychology’s early years due to prejudice and lack of understanding, this is a message today’s psychotherapists must take seriously. Human beings need a deeper and wider transpersonal vision of who and what we are, which the saints and sages of the world’s spiritual traditions have always pointed to. In psychotherapy with a therapist committed to such a vision, patients penetrate into their unconscious depths and not infrequently awaken to the Ground of all Being. Their suffering itself occurred because they had turned away from Spirit. Above all, this volume passionately calls upon depth psychology to remember its origin in the perennial wisdom at the core of the great religions. There is something of a polemic in these pages. It deserves to be considered by depth psychologists of all persuasions.”
—Bryan Wittine, Transpersonal psychologist and Jungian psychoanalyst

“This anthology from Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is a must reference for anyone who is interested in psychology and its relationship to spirituality, and in developing an inclusive dialogue between disciplines that favor an integral outlook on the person and his or her potential. Selections in this anthology will inspire us to reexamine the metaphysical underpinnings of psychology, and remind us how important it is to rise above science’s attempt to reduce the human being to an epistemic object.”
—Sangeetha Menon, National Institute of Advanced Studies (Bangalore, India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Beyond Experience: Consciousness in Bhagavad Gita

“This anthology has some of the most discerning essays and reviews on spirituality and psychology, which provide much-needed care and caution to all those engaged in bringing them together or who wish to do so in future. Therefore, it is a must-read for all those who teach, research, consult, or study in such frontier areas as transpersonal psychology, states of consciousness, mind-body relation, holistic health, Indian psychology, and so on. It will be an invaluable textbook for courses in these and other related areas. I congratulate the editor of the book.”
—Kiran Kumar K. Salagame, University of Mysore (India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Psychology of Meditation: A Contextual Approach

“One of the finest collections of essays on the Perennial Philosophy—a must-read for all psychologists who are engaged with spirituality and transpersonal psychology. The essays which critique modern psychology (including transpersonal psychology, and the framework of Carl Jung), in the light of the Perennial Philosophy are a revelation and make compelling reading. The book serves as a corrective to the excesses of modern psychology, and to this end Sotillos has done a commendable job. I for one will include the book in some of the graduate courses that I teach.”
—Suneet Varma, University of Delhi, co-editor of Foundations of Indian Psychology

“To its credit modern science by-and-large is becoming more cognizant of the essential connection between spirituality and psychological health and well-being and most of all its positive implications within the field of psychology. While there is ample data to document this in a plethora of academic journals and books, this new book Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy adds a novel contribution to the dialogue between psychology and spirituality, which captures many nuances that for the most part go unnoticed within these discussions, and last but not least, it provides a keen eye of discernment to understand this intricate relationship on a deeper level that is crucially needed. This work will be a valuable asset to students and long term mental health practitioners and professors alike who seek to better understand the relationship between psychology and spirituality.”
—Harold G. Koenig, Duke University, Director of the Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health, co-author of The Handbook of Religion and Health

Both for Kant and for Nietzsche, aesthetics must not be considered as a systematic science based merely on logical premises but rather as a set of intuitively attained artistic ideas that constitute or reconstitute the sensible perceptions and supersensible representations into a new whole. Kantian and Nietzschean aesthetics are both aiming to see beyond the forms of objects to provide explanations for the nobility and sublimity of human art and life. We can safely say that Kant and Nietzsche used the dualities of the beautiful/sublime and Apollonian/Dionysian to advocate their general philosophical worldview, and that the initial formation (in Observations and The Birth of Tragedy) and final dissolution (in the Critique of Judgment and Zarathustra and other later works) of these dualities are determined by the gradually established telos of their philosophical endeavor. Therefore, by observing the evolution of these so-called dualities, Kaplama gathers important clues as to how Kant's and Nietzsche's aesthetics transformed into different ways to affirm human art and life. On the one hand, Kaplama argues, the Dionysian came to be the heart and soul of Nietzschean aesthetics and ethics, and the Apollonian (or the formal drive of individuation) was reduced into a mere aesthetic criterion. On the other, Kant treats the sublime (which is originally an idea-producing feeling and/or judgment) as a mere appendix to his Critique of Judgment and aesthetic theory teleologically reducing it into its possible moral consequences. This is why Schopenhauer calls the sublime " by far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Judgment " which touches on the real problem of aesthetics very closely but does not provide a real solution for it. Kant's forced teleological move is to make his theory of aesthetic judgment stand as a 'reaffirmation' of the www.cosmosandhistory.org 166

In one sense, this book is about the contemporary dialogue between science and spirituality, and more specifically, ways in which they do not "talk" well to each other—I offer a remedy for bridging that gap. One approach is to explore how metaphysical/mystical thinking and rational/logical thinking manifest as modes of meaning-making within human consciousness—within your consciousness. That is, by getting to know these two modes of thinking within the individual psyche and within mundane experience, we find an opening to supporting society's dialogue between, and integration of, these modes of discourse.
There have already been many attempts to integrate these two domains. For example: using quantum mechanics to explain consciousness; showing how stale science can be re- enchanted through a captivating story of the evolution of the cosmos; doing a statistical analysis of religious beliefs in a population; or fMRI measurements of the brains of meditation adepts. Yet spiritual thinking and scientific thinking are rarely integrated. Or to put it another way, the metaphysical claims and esoteric experiences of spirituality have an uneasy relationship with logical or "rational" modes of meaning-making. It is a given that science and rationality are important, both in their proven products in a technologically advanced society, and also in their ability to critique and sanitize the "irrationality" within metaphysical, religious, dogmatic, and emotion-laden thought. But the role of pre-rational making-making is less well appreciated; and when it is acknowledged, it is through its more romantic characteristics. One thing I will argue is that the pre-rational mind (its magical and mythical layers) is actually an essential foundation upon which all rational (including scientific) thought is built. The pre-rational layers, often maligned in modernity, contain life-and-meaning generative capacities that are sorely need. But that is getting ahead of our story.
Here what I want to point out is what scientific (or hyper-rational) and spiritual (or religious and metaphysical) modes of discourse tend to have in common: the certainty or confidence of their claims. This text is, in one sense, a deep critique of how certainty is performed in both spiritual (or metaphysical) and scientific (or modern hyper-rational) circles—actually in all realms of thought and belief. I will argue for the increasing importance of "negative capability"—i.e. for humility, tolerance for uncertainty, and openness to multiple perspectives. —And for an appreciation of the (now proven) fundamental limitations of reason, logic, theoretical models, and even the foundational flaws in the ability for language and concepts to capture reality.
That knowledge is incomplete and fallible and that beliefs tend to be biased—these are well-oiled aphorisms. But to develop a transformative and actionable understanding of personal meaning-making and social knowledge-building processes one needs a deep
understanding of exactly how belief and knowledge are fallible. And it is a transformative or radical understanding that is called for. For most of humanity's history the main social "project" was about understanding and taming nature. We have entered a new era wherein the vast majority of human problems are caused by human nature, and so the most important inquiries now should be into self-understanding to allow the self- transformation and self-liberation that might, if we are lucky, reverse, or at least adapt to, the ultimately tragic ends that human "reason" has wrought through modern technologies and social structures.
"Know thyself" has become more than a philosophical and ethical imperative—it has become a species-existential one. And our focus here will be on knowing how and what we don't know—i.e. on unknowing. In another sense our exploration will be about the importance of reducing or releasing complexity in the psyche and in socio-cultural structures—at a time in which it might seem that we cannot avoid increasing complexity.

This paper regards Leonardo Polo’s motivation for his proposal of a new method in metaphysics, the science of being. It is presented a brief comparison with similar motivations in the area of Thomistic thought. The three main points of the proposal are: the problem of the mental limit, the notion of habitual knowledge, the distinction between metaphysics and the transcendental anthropology.

There is nothing wrong with Black people; something happened to Black people. It is my personal belief that African Americans are not sick or mentally ill people, we are simply sick from being constantly exposed to the sickness of racism and racist people! By deepening our understanding on how to properly use metaphysical meditation and affirmations daily along with raising our vibration beyond the sickness of institutionalized racism and white supremacy, we can heal the trauma of generational poverty in African Americans.

The Society for the Phenomenology of Religious Experience invites submissions of high quality abstracts of 150-300 words for its group meeting at the Central APA. The APA is currently planning the Central Division meeting at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago, IL, on February 23-26, 2022, with virtual backup plans. Abstracts should be anonymized and sent by email to apacentral@sophere.org before August 15 with the subject line “Central APA Submission”. Notifications of acceptance will be emailed by Aug 25. Paper presentation time should be no more than 20-30 minutes.

Religious/Spiritual Experience and Metaphysics
Sessions Co-Chairs: Olga Louchakova-Schwartz (UC Davis) and Andrew Oberg (University of Kochi)

In these two panels, we seek to address relationships between religious or spiritual experience (RSE) and metaphysics.
RSE are associated with interruptions in ordinary language/common sense experience of the everyday (cf. Dahl; Barber; Heidegger). RSE interruptions create specific changes in perception, but it is not clear if and how RSE phenomena as described by i.e. mystics (such as internal perception of light, sound, altered perception of the body (re: spatiality, density, depth, other parameters), internal stillness, motion, presence or disconnect, etc.) impact one’s beliefs and/or attendant metaphysical (pre)suppositions. Do RSE change empirical realism of the natural attitude, religious attitude, or one’s metaphysics of the self? In the first panel, we invite concrete empirical and textual investigations of relationships between the perceptual and conceptual aspects of RSE across different traditions. The papers can include both first person and second person descriptive phenomenological researches or an intertwining of different phenomenological analyses.
The second panel seeks revisionist metaphysical proposals that include a reference to formal phenomenological analyses of consciousness in RSE. By contrast with the ordinary experience of objects, originary self-giving in RSE can be non-associative, open-ended, undetermined; in other words, excluding mental or "real" (empirically so) objects. Therefore, a descriptive metaphysics of such consciousness needs to be non-object related (cf. Ladyman, French). What is the nature of reality “displayed” by RSE? Besides covering the metaphysics of consciousness, the panel welcomes speculative extensions of such phenomenologically grounded metaphysics into realist contexts, such as e.g., metaphysics of the quantum world or Minkowski space-time.
Contact: olouchakova@gmail.com

We live in an age of movement. More than at any other time in history , people and things move longer distances, more frequently, and faster than ever before. All that was solid melted into air long ago and is now in full circulation around the world like dandelion seeds adrift on turbulent winds. We find ourselves, in the early twenty-first century, in a world where every major domain of human activity has become increasingly defined by motion. 1 We have entered a new historical era defined in large part by movement and mobility and are now in need of a new historical on-tology appropriate to our time. The observation that the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first was marked by an increasingly " liquid " and " mobile modernity " is now something widely recognized in the scholarly literature at the turn of the century. 2 Today, however, our orientation to this event is quite different. Almost twenty years into the twenty-first century we now find ourselves situated on the other side of this heralded transition. The question that confronts us today is thus a new one: how to fold all that has melted back up into new solids. 3

Part I – Spirilla Theory and Cosmology
Stephen Hawking once proclaimed that String Theory may be able to unify the various forces although later he became disillusioned thinking that there may be no Theory of Everything. This very condensed book pulls together the various forces into the Spirilla Theory which supersedes String Theory and introduces the Relativity of Consciousness.

The foundation of the Spirilla Theory is based on the writings of H. P. Blavatsky, A. B. Bailey, and A. Besant. By overlaying the works of Einstein, Bohm, de Broglie, Dirac, Bell and other great scientific minds, on top of the foundation, the unification of the various forces and theories starts to appear; each field of study supplying a part of the puzzle but only a holistic view of ALL endeavors will solve the mystery. The book starts by laying the groundwork through the Introduction, a review of Bell’s Theorem and p-adic mathematics; following this, each major section begins with a quote from the foundational works followed by the quotes from scientific papers demonstrating the current known thinking on the various topics; no attempts are made to edit the works (except with a few exceptions for clarity and/or length) of the various authors and references to the scientists’ works are maintained. Each section is pulled together so that a picture can be seen.
This section;
1. Redefines the atom with the addition of a subquark;
2. Defines the Spirilla Theory which unifies Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity, and explains Quantum Entanglement;
3. Defines new particles;
4. Redefines time and space;
5. Defines and solves the mystery of Black Holes and links the cosmic and quantum black hole through the spirillae;
6. Delves into the mystery of the Macroverse;
7. Outlines the steps in the origins of the universe;
8. Adds an equation to Einstein’s original 1905 paper on relativity which sees the speed of light approaching infinity;
9. Gives the foundation for developing space travel; and, as an appendix,
10. Gives detailed information for the development of a new energy source – Quantum Energy.

Part II - Ontology, Epistemology & Manifestations
Part II is divided into three sections:
1. Ontology and the fundamental concepts of reality which discusses:
a. consciousness and delves into the mystery of human consciousness having cosmic origins;
b. reincarnation and gives the various laws affecting rebirth, with a discussion on the principle of mutation and the perfecting of form;
c. the work of form-building, transmutation of form and the building of a human form.
2. Epistemology which covers a great deal of topics however; for the purposes of NOE the subject is restricted to;
a. evolution including a definition of the Law of Evolution, the cyclic ebb and flow and the rhythmic work of creation, the process of substitution, the evolution of man and the genesis of the pithecoid stocks; and
b. death including the processes of death, two main reasons for cremation and the sequence of events at death.
3. Manifestations of the various religions including:
a. why Christians don’t believe in reincarnation;
b. the coming science of invocation and evocation;
c. Quantum Entanglement Over Time (QEoT) or The Law of Cause and Effect, and The Law of Karma with a discussion on The Golden Rule ; and
d. The New World Religion.

The objective of this paper is to present an integral view from the perspectives of science and metaphysics of the nature of intention and how intention affects the physical world. The paper begins with an overview of research on the effects of intention on inanimate and animate objects, which provide evidence that intentions affect physical matter, followed by an exploration of intention as brain waves and thought forms. It then examines the nature of energy and existence, covering concepts such as a universal energy source, holographic information fields, the universe as a multi-dimensional reality, vibrational frequency and resonance, the body as light energy, and the role of the heart. The paper then investigates the unique nature of heart-centered intention and discusses various intentional healing approaches, including self-healing, distant healing, intercessory prayer, and spiritual healing. The paper examines the effects of negative intentions and intention in altered states of consciousness. Finally it discusses intention as a co-creative process and an ongoing force that enables humans to shape reality, and presents mind-over-matter models of how intention affects the physical world.

[1] What does the word ‘physical’ mean in its most general theoretical philosophical use? It’s used in many different ways, and it’s hard to imagine that philosophers could reach agreement on a best use. [2] Should we tie the meaning of ‘physical’ closely to physics? To do so (in a non-circular way) is to run the risk of ruling out the possibility that there might be two different universes that were ‘formally’ or structurally identical or homomorphic although substantially different—made of different stuff. [3] Perhaps that is not in the end a real possibility. Even so, it seems that we shouldn’t define ‘physical’ in a way that rules it out a priori. [4] If so, it may be that the word ‘physical’ is best used to denote a certain fundamental structure-transcendent stuff-nature—call it P—that allows the possibility that a universe with stuff nature Q structurally identical to a physical universe isn’t physical. [5] Can we suppose ourselves to know something about the ultimate intrinsic nature of P, if physicalism is true? I argue that we can. [6] Can we draw any further metaphysical conclusions from this knowledge? I argue that we can. We can show that panpsychism in some form constitutes the most plausible theory of the ultimate nature of P.

The paper examines ontological presuppositions and epistemological branches of Peace and Conflict Studies. It describes the narrower use of the concepts ‗ontology‘ and ‗epistemology‘ as sub-branch and branch of philosophy respectively and later focus on their meanings in the context of particular areas of inquiry. It highlights the most basic of the core field definition and distinction issues in Peace and Conflict Studies—what peace is; the nature, causes, outbreak, and dynamics of conflict; and the means for resolving conflict and building sustainable peace. It presents and offers answers to key ontological questions: what exist, in what form do they exist, what are the conditions under which they exist, what is their relationships with other things that are said to exist regarding the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. Furthermore, the paper reviews ways of knowing, understanding, explaining and justifying the ontological presuppositions. Thus it discusses the three epistemological branches of Peace and Conflict Studies proposed by Johan Galtung—empirical peace studies, critical peace studies, and constructive peace studies—and their implications for values, empirical data and theory. In light of this epistemology, the author posits that values, followed by data, take preeminence in the applied Social Sciences field of Peace and Conflict Studies.

The Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong's 王充 (27-100 CE) influence on the “pure conversation” (qingtan 清談) movement in the 3rd century CE is well known. His Lunheng 論衡 was prized and used by Cai Yong 蔡邕 (132-192 CE), Wang Lang 王朗 (d. 228 CE), and a number of others as aid in their argumentative pursuits, which largely followed the methods devised by Wang. The connection of Xuanxue to the qingtan movement is also well known. In this paper, I argue that WANG Chong’s view of the connection between nature (xing 性), generation (sheng 生), and their implications for ziran 自然 (spontaneity) influenced Xuanxue views of ziran, particularly those offered by Wang Bi 王弼 (226-249 CE) and Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312 CE). Wang used ziran primarily to make sense of causation in the absence of purposive activity. He minimized the role of purposive activity in the determination of outcomes of life based on allotment, in part to make sense of the frequent inconsistencies between effort and outcomes. This led him to a view of ziran as itself a principle of development and activity tied to the nature of a thing. This view is further developed by Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, both of whom adopt a view of ziran as the principle of development tied to the nature of a thing.