Proportionality

The COVID-19 infection fatality rate for children under the age of 17 is less than 0,003%. Children are at extremely low risk of severe illness from COVID-19, and children do not spread the illness in any significant way. Once a vaccine becomes widely available for schoolchildren, will lawmakers leave it up to parents and guardians to choose whether to vaccinate their children or will they mandate schoolchildren to get a COVID-19 vaccine to attend school? This article assesses both arguments for and against mandatory COVID-19 vaccination for school children. The article further analyzes applicable international bioethical and human rights norms and standards with regard to informed consent as contained in the various international treaties to hold states legally accountable for their actions under international law. To determine whether states may impose vaccine mandates for school children in terms of international human rights law, a proportionality test is applied. The critical focus of this article is explicating the rudiments of the bioethical and human rights standards relating to the mandatory COVID-19 vaccination of schoolchildren that must be confronted to ensure that children, that is, humanity's most valuable asset for the future, are afforded their fundamental human rights. Ultimately, it highlights the importance that these international bioethical norms are built into decision-making by public authorities when measures to prevent the spread of infectious disease with a case fatality rate of less than 0,003% in children are instituted.

This paper, which is a contribution to the EUI EUDO citizenship debate on Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann [2010] launched by Prof. Jo Shaw, critiques this remarkable judgement of the Court of Justice, suggesting possible ways forward in the development of the concept of EU citizenship in the future. How is Rottmann important? Could the ECJ decide differently? What are the consequences of the restrictive approach chosen by the Court? It is suggested that Rottmann is just one of the first steps in the paradigmatic shift in the understanding of the legal meaning of citizenship which will be shaping EU law in the years to come.

Drug calculations are performed by nurses to administer a treatment to a patient. Any mistake can be detrimental to the quality of the treatment. This research follows some questions of a team of trainers about two beliefs shared in their professional environment which have consequences on their didactic choices: 1° teaching a systematic calculation method would prevent mistakes; 2° Many mistakes would be avoided thanks to training which would allow to comprehend the administration of a treatment globally. The research first shows consequences of these didactic choices on the practice of trainers and on how students learn before challenging its relevance through an evaluation of different drug calculations carried out by nurses undergoing training.

States are struggling to replace the anti-Covid-19 lockdowns that threaten the economy and freeze human mobility and interactions with softer, more digitalized forms of social distancing. The article analyzes to what extent fundamental rights' issues revolving around tools such as smartphone apps that trace contacts are justiciable. The article focuses on the role of science, of amici curiae, and of proportionality scrutiny as three key elements that can play a role adjudicating cases of this kind. Con un passo molto diverso da un ordinamento all'altro e non senza gravi incertezze, vanno aumentando le fila dei Paesi che tentano di uscire da un quadro di misure di controllo e distanziamento sociale particolarmente rigido, per sostituirle con strumenti più misurati, dal minore impatto economico e sociale e dunque più sostenibili. Tale necessità è aggravata dall'evidenza maturata progressivamente secondo cui la convivenza con il Covid-19 durerà a lungo, anche per le possibili recrudescenze dell'epidemia 1. La società è destinata a riorganizzarsi intorno al rischio di una nuova ondata, bilanciando dunque l'esigenza di proteggere la salute con la necessità di riprendere le attività economiche in un contesto inevitabilmente globalizzato. Quest'ultimo ha reso le relazioni transnazionali talmente fitte, le economie tanto interdipendenti e le barriere fisiche e giuridiche così porose che non è pensabile per un ordinamento isolarsi ed evitare il contagio dall'estero tanto a lungo senza mettere a repentaglio la propria sopravvivenza 2. • L'autore ringrazia Erik Longo, Roberta Lugarà, Giada Ragone e Arianna Vedaschi per gli utili commenti su versioni precedenti di questo contributo; ringrazia altresì i revisori anonimi per loro le osservazioni, che hanno consentito di migliorarlo.

Le présent article analyse la constitutionnalité du régime fédéral encadrant l’accès à l’aide médicale à mourir tel que modifié par le projet de loi C-7 adopté dans la foulée du jugement Truchon c Procureur général du Canada ayant déclaré inconstitutionnel le critère de « mort raisonnablement prévisible ».

Les responsabilités constitutionnelles des législateurs fédéral et provinciaux sont examinées. Ceux-ci doivent assurer l’égale protection des droits précisément garantis par la Charte canadienne, dont (i) les droits à l’autonomie et à la sécurité ; (ii) le droit à la vie ou « droit de ne pas mourir » et la possibilité d’y renoncer depuis l’arrêt Carter ; (iii) l’égalité substantive protégeant l’égale valeur de toutes les vies, incluant celles des personnes victimes discriminées ou autrement vulnérables.

Certaines interrogations sont formulées quant à la constitutionnalité du nouveau régime fédéral. Le jugement Truchon ayant fondé le projet de loi C-7 contient des erreurs de droit déterminantes. De plus, il est incertain que ce régime protège au mieux les droits à l’autonomie et à l’égalité substantive. Est notamment considéré l’effet possiblement discriminatoire envers les femmes et les personnes combinant d’autres facteurs d’inégalités dont les troubles de santé mentale et le handicap. Enfin, est remise en question la constitutionnalité de l’inclusion dans le Code criminel d’une disposition prévoyant que la maladie mentale comme seule condition au soutien de la demande sera automatiquement légalisée dans deux ans, alors que les connaissances juridiques, éthiques et scientifiques actuelles ont justifié d’écarter cette ouverture.

INTRODUCTION

1. LES RESPONSABILITÉS CONSTITUTIONNELLES DES LÉGISLATEURS EN MATIÈRE D’AIDE MÉDICALE À MOURIR

1.1 Adopter un régime législatif assurant l’égale protection des droits précisément garantis par la Charte canadienne
a) Les droits à l’autonomie et à la sécurité de sa personne : une protection constitutionnelle distincte du seul consentement médical
b) Le droit à la vie ou « droit de ne pas mourir » et la possibilité d’y renoncer
c) La protection substantive du droit à l’égalité

1.2 Assurer la protection législative des droits constitutionnels en jeu conformément à la norme de l’article premier de la Charte canadienne

2. LA CONSTITUTIONNALITÉ DU RÉGIME LÉGISLATIF DÉCOULANT DE L’ADOPTION DU PROJET DE LOI FÉDÉRAL C-7

2.1 Le régime fédéral tel que modifié par le projet de loi C-7
a) L’abrogation du critère limitant l’accès à l’aide médicale à mourir aux personnes dont la mort naturelle est devenue raisonnablement prévisible
b) La « maladie mentale » comme seule condition médicale invoquée pour fonder la demande officielle d’aide médicale à mourir
c) La mise en place de mesures de sauvegarde distinctes selon que la mort naturelle du patient est devenue raisonnablement prévisible ou non
d) L’assouplissement des mesures de sauvegarde applicables à la fois lorsque la mort du patient est raisonnablement prévisible et lorsqu’elle ne l’est pas
e) La renonciation au consentement libre et éclairé au moment où l’aide médicale à mourir est fournie

2.2 La constitutionnalité du nouveau régime législatif : quelques interrogations
a) Le législateur devait-il modifier le régime en raison du jugement Truchon ayant
déclaré inconstitutionnel le critère de « mort naturelle devenue raisonnablement prévisible » ?
b) Le régime protège-t-il les droits à l’autonomie et à l’égalité substantive ? Le cas de la
discrimination systémique envers les femmes et les facteurs d’inégalités additionnels
incluant la maladie mentale et le handicap
c) L’inclusion dans le Code criminel d’une disposition prévoyant que la maladie mentale comme seule condition au soutien de la demande sera automatiquement
légalisée dans deux ans est-elle constitutionnelle ?

CONCLUSION

The "principle of proportionality" is widely considered to be a cornerstone of German constitutional law (despite its shallow foundation in the Basic Law's text). Yet its actual shape varies surprisingly, appearing in judicial decisions as well as in scholarly textbooks at times as a 3-, 4-, or even 5-step test. This paper argues that what is nowadays taken together as "proportionality" comes down in fact to two distinct requirements ("proportionality strictly speaking" and "necessity") that are bundled only for practical rather than logical purposes. The various annexes, on the other hand, can be identified as having other constitutional basises, and should thus be kept apart from any concept of proportionality.

The possibility of a normative theory of proportionality in the implementation of the human rights protection have not to lead to be unaware of the specifics of the legal reasoning. A moral and political philosophy discussion can help the concept's analysis and more particularly the analysis of the concept of proportionality, but the philosophical concept of proportionality is not designed for a substitution for the legal reasoning. The paper criticizes as much the normative analysis of proportionality that regards the rights like values to optimize as the juridical analysis that radicalize a strong opposition between rules and principles.

社科法學乃蘇永欽教授所提出「法學的想像」中的四個道標之一，並倡議一種社
科法學與法釋（教）義學相輔相成的「輔助命題」。然此命題對法釋（教）義學
外的其他法學思維則似未提及。而致力社科法學此一研究取徑的張永健教授，則
以吾人最為熟知的比例原則為目標，提出一「取代命題」：以成本效益分析取代
比例原則。

為反對「取代命題」，本文試圖指出作為法學思維的比例原則肩負了正確性與拘
束性的雙重任務，並從一虛擬案例出發，指出「純粹」的成本效益分析似未對拘
束性任務與以承受。藉當代英美分析法理學的論述展示拘束性之意義後，本文進
而將之以形式原則理解，並探討比例原則以何種可能方式安置了拘束性此一特性。

Esta  pesquisa  tem  como  objetivo  a  análise  dos  limites  que  separam  o  excesso  e  as  condutas necessárias  à  efetivação  da  legítima  defesa  realizada  por  artistas  marciais,  de  modo  a  assegurar a  proteção  de  bens  jurídicos  relevantes.  Para  tal,  usou-se  o  método  bibliográfico  descritivoexploratório,  que  permite  a  exposição  de  conceitos  e  processos,  tanto  psicofisiológicos  quanto ocasionais,  desencadeados  em  uma  situação  de  injusta  agressão.  Além  disso,  utilizou-se  o método  de  abordagem  hipotético-dedutivo,  que  possibilita  a  visualização  de  situações hipotéticas  a  fim  de  compreender  a  dinâmica  dos  cenários  de  agressão  injusta.  Dessa  forma, este  estudo  se  fez  necessário  para  oferecer  aos  magistrados  um  ponto  de  vista  sobre  o julgamento  da  proporcionalidade  da  legítima  defesa  praticada  por  artistas  marciais,  de  maneira a  evitar  o  cometimento  de  erros  judiciais  oriundos  da  condenação  de  condutas  lícitas  ou  da absolvição  de  comportamentos  ilícitos,  diante  das  conjecturas  nas  quais  os  artistas  marciais usam  suas  técnicas  para  efetivar  a  defesa  ou  escolhem  usar,  em  vez  delas,  outros  meios.  Assim, verificou-se  que  as  situações  de  agressão  injusta  não  permitem  a  plena  percepção  de  todas  suas as  circunstâncias  no  momento  em  que  ocorre,  de  modo  que  o  artista  marcial  precisa  agir  de maneira  incisiva  para  que  consiga  seguramente  efetivar  sua  defesa  ou  de  terceiros  e  evitar  a consumação  de  lesão  a  bens  jurídicos  primordiais. 

Palavras-chave:  legítima  defesa;  artes  marciais;  excesso;  efetivação;  moderação.

To speak of human rights is to speak of proportionality. Proportionality has been received into the constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Israel, South Africa, and the United States, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights. This volume brings together many of the world’s leading constitutional proponents and critics of proportionality to debate the merits of proportionality, the nature of rights, the practice of judicial review, and moral and legal reasoning.

The result of research on the history of mechanical engineering and design, this study identifies Leonardo’s innovative approaches to technical problems, correcting previous assumptions about his lack of technical knowledge as an engineer. Innovative strategies include his use of Euclidian and Archimedean geometry, dimetric parallel projection, consistency of scale, proportions of one-third throughout the structure, and proportional calculations of its force. The sophistication and precision of the drawing, compared with others by Leonardo and his contemporaries, locates it among his plans for a military treatise, re-dates it to a later period of 1490-93, and associates it with similar working methods across disciplines at the turn of the sixteenth century.

O artigo apresenta metodologia de orientação e controle dos interesses político-criminais, baseada na estrutura trifásica do dever de proporcionalidade e nos conceitos de merecimento, carência e dignidade penal. Propõe-se uma análise valorativa e finalística a partir da dogmática do direito penal e constitucional, para além da estrita verificação de utilidade da lei penal.

This paper explores the convergence of musical and architectural theory in Vitruvius’ De Architectura. Section 1 describes Vitruvius’ architectural lexicon, borrowed from Aristoxenus (I.2), and explores his description of the laws of harmony, modeled on Elementa Harmonica (V.4). Section 2 explores how Vitruvius proposes using music theory in practical architectural design, including construction of columns using architectural orders analogous to Aristoxenian genera (I.2.6; IV.1); acoustical designs for theatres (V.5); and the development of machines, including siege engines ‘tuned’ like musical instruments (X.12) and water-organs [hydrauli] constructed to execute all the different varieties of tuning (X.8). Section 3 reflects on Vitruvius’ use of analogies with a musical instrument, the sambuca, to explain his understanding of cosmic harmony and architectural form, and his possible sources (VI.1). Finally, Section 4 discusses Vitruvius’ ideas about the importance of a liberal arts education that includes study of music theory. The best architects, Vitruvius explains, can discover in music the secrets to forms they both encounter in nature and create themselves.

The main question of this paper is: what do institutions "extend" from and to and how are they influenced by "intensification"? This concept paper does not mediate between old institutionalism and new institutionalism. It does not offer suggestions to policy makers, though implications from the practical examples presented may be applied in Russia. What it offers, in the spirit of sociology of science (социология науки) is an alternative language/paradigm to "evolutionary economics" that is relevant for studying institutional change across a range of fields, industries and sectors.

1. La proporzionalità come principio basilare dell’attività
amministrativa: un viaggio da Berlino a Roma, passando per Lussemburgo. - 2. Stazione di partenza: Berlino (ovvero dell’elaborazione tedesca della proporzionalità quale principio specifico, composto e trifasico). – 3. Una tappa
intermedia (ovvero del recepimento e della rielaborazione del principio di proporzionalità da parte della Corte di giustizia). – 4. L’arrivo a Roma (ovvero della difficoltà di individuare la versione italiana della proporzionalità). – 5.
Qualche conclusione, proseguendo il viaggio.

This article readdresses the Przywara-Barth controversy concerning analogia entis. The main point of our analysis is the question of whether the concept of analogy presented by Erich Przywara was in line with the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic definition and use of analogy in theistic predication. First, we ask about Przywara's strong conviction that analogy is primarily a metaphysical and not merely a grammatical doctrine. Secondly, after presenting the complexity of Aquinas' notion of analogy, as well as the variety of opinions on this subject among his commentators, we analyze (1) the objectives of Przywara's view of analogia entis, (2) his grounding it in the terminology taken from the typology offered by Cajetan and juxtaposing analogia proportionalitatis and analogia attributionis, and (3) his introduction of the concept of "a new 'attributive analogy' " proceeding from above to below and sustaining the tension within analogia entis. We show that Przywara remained a faithful student and interpreter of Thomas, where this makes Barth's accusation that the Catholic doctrine of analogia entis puts God and creatures on a common plane of being unjustified.

Le droit administratif a une approche bien paradoxale du contrôle de proportionnalité. Ce terme renvoie toute personne passée par une deuxième année de droit à des « grands arrêts » inscrits pour toujours dans sa mémoire : « Benjamin, 1933 » ou « Ville nouvelle Est, 1971 », pour ne retenir que ceux-là. Ils marquent des avancées significatives du droit administratif, des libertés publiques et du rôle du juge. Mais ce contrôle sent aussi le souffre. Le juge administratif ne va-t-il pas, en l’exerçant, jusqu’à opérer un contrôle de l’opportunité des décisions administratives ? En se plaçant dans les mêmes conditions qu’un administrateur qui prend sa décision, ne (re)prend-il pas, en réalité, le rôle de l’administrateur ?
À bien y regarder, ce contrôle est marqué par un épanouissement particulier dans certaines matières, épanouissement qui ne l’empêche pas de rester complexe et en extension latente. D’une part, en effet, on trouve deux domaines dans lesquels il s’épanouit spécialement, pour des raisons différentes : les libertés publiques et l’analyse de situations complexes. (I) D’autre part, une analyse des situations dans lesquelles on le rencontre montre qu’il est protéiforme et en mutation… La fin définitive du tabou serait-elle en vue ? (II).

To confuse it with the exclusion of the law without creatig criteria for interpreting the rule in futures cases is to ignore what is to review the law in concreto. In concreto review, like control in abstracto too, which do not oppose as much as their denomination suggests, are in the construction of the rule and the case, two things closely interwined in law

The principle of proportionality, which is designed to limit abuse of power and infringement of human rights by governments, has become a fundamental and binding legal principle in the jurisprudence of many countries. Ever since the seminal R. v. Oakes decision, when the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as entailing a three-step proportionality test, proportionality has become an important pillar of Canadian law.

This article examines whether the principle of proportionality extends or should extend to the private sphere and impose some limitations on employers and trade unions when they exert as much control over an individual’s life as governments. It first argues at a descriptive level that proportionality already plays a significant role (although often not explicitly) in various Canadian labour and employment law contexts, a role not sufficiently acknowledged thus far. It then turns to the normative level and explores the justifications for extending the application of proportionality to the private sphere and more specifically to the employment relationship. First, it explains why a higher standard of behaviour is required in employment relationships as opposed to other contracts. Second, it defends the use of proportionality stressing its legal and analytical merits. Lastly, it demonstrates that the application of proportionality fits within contemporary legal doctrines and advances legal coherence. The article therefore advocates a more explicit use and structured application of the three-stage proportionality test in various employment and labour law contexts.

The findings of this article could thus contribute to the development of labour and employment law; they are also highly relevant to the more general discussion about the applicability of the principle of proportionality outside the boundaries of public law.

Il capitolo IV della Dichiarazione è dedicato alla spiegazione de «L'uso proporzionato dei mezzi terapeutici». Ma, nonostante sia stato pubblicato nel 1980, il suo insegnamento su questo delicato problema è ancora ignorato da molti, cattolici e non. Si percepisce spesso, infatti, che molti autori e tante persone comuni pensano che l'insegnamento della Chiesa sia di stampo «vitalista»: la vita umana deve essere sempre favorita e pertanto esiste l'obbligo morale di utilizzare tutti mezzi medici disponibili per prolungarla, a qualunque costo. In realtà, come vedremo, non è questa la visione e la dottrina proposta dalla secolare tradizione della teologia morale cattolica e insegnata dal Magistero attuale.

Penafsiran konstitusi harus dilakukan dengan rasional untuk menghindari pilihan argumentasi secara cherry-picking. Hal ini ditunjukkan oleh pertentangan dalam dua Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia (MKRI) yang berpendirian dengan argumen yang sama sekali berlawanan. Pada tahun 2003, MKRI menyatakan Pasal 28I ayat (1) tidak dapat dibatasi oleh ketentuan apapun, namun pada tahun 2007 dinyatakan bahwa pasal yang sama dapat dibatasi sesuai dengan limitation clause UUD 1945, yaitu Pasal 28J ayat (2). Keberadaan limitation clause dalam UUD 1945 dapat menjadi alasan untuk menyimpangi hak konstitusional yang sudah dienumerasi dalam teks konstitusi. Dengan demikian, tidak semua penafsiran terhadap ketentuan tersebut dapat menjamin bahwa pembatasan hak fundamental dilakukan dengan benar. Dalam khazanah hukum konstitusi, penggunaan prinsip proporsionalitas dapat dilakukan untuk menyelesaikan hak yang bertentangan atau conflicting principles.
Penelitan ini bersifat deskriptif-analitis dan preskriptif yang dilakukan dengan metode yuridis normatif. Penelitian ini melakukan studi kepustakaan terhadap teori dan praktik yang dibutuhkan untuk membedah topik penelitan ini.
Hasil penelitan ini menunjukkan bahwa MKRI tidak mengenal prinsip proporsionalitas, karena tidak pernah menggunakan prinsip tersebut secara formal dalam putusan yang menjadi objek penelitan. Namun, secara implisit terdapat beberapa tahap dalam uji proporsionalitas yang dilakukan oleh MKRI. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa limitation clause dalam UUD 1945 dapat mendukung penerapan uji proporsionalitas. Penelitian ini juga mendemonstrasikan kemungkinan penerapan prinsip proporsionalitas terhadap putusan yang menjadi objek penelitian.

La pratique récente de la Cour de cassation et du Conseil d'État a montré le développement d'une distinction dans le contrôle de proportionnalité au titre de l'application des exigences du droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme entre contrôle de proportionnalité de la norme elle-même et contrôle de proportionnalité de l'application de la norme au cas individuel qui est soumis au juge. Il faut ainsi distinguer le contrôle de proportionnalité sur la restriction que la norme applicable porte à un droit fondamental au nom d'un intérêt public et le contrôle, présenté comme de nature différente, qui porte non sur la norme, mais sur l'application de la norme à un cas concret pour vérifier si elle ne doit pas être écartée dans ce cas. On distingue ainsi avec le juge un contrôle dit in abstracto et un contrôle dit in concreto. La mise en évidence de la portée du contrôle dit in concreto est apparue particulièrement visible dans les cas où les cours suprêmes l'ont présenté comme distinct et de nature différente du contrôle qu'elles pouvaient exercer par ailleurs, toujours sur la base d'un contrôle de conventionalité, sur la proportionnalité des textes eux-mêmes dont elles avaient à faire application, in abstracto, au regard des équilibres entre les droits et intérêts protégés par la Convention. Cela est apparu en particulier dans les affaires qui ont conduit nos deux cours suprêmes à écarter l'application d'interdits législatifs dont elles reconnaissaient explicitement (ou implicitement) qu'ils étaient conformes in abstracto à la Convention, parce que leur application aux cas qui leur étaient soumis portait, du fait du caractère disproportionné de l'application de la loi à ces cas, une violation d'un des droits protégés par la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme.

Consumer protection has become a legal phenomenon to reckon with on a global scale, with repercussions for, among others, contracts concluded between consumers and business entities – i.e., B2C contracts. While the path chosen by EU law is one of special legal protection (on the basis of special legislation) and the introduction of restrictions, the model applied in the United States is based on protection afforded according to general law of contract principles. The author maintains that the model applied in the United States is more efficient as it does not prevent markets which are based on a high degree of autonomy (but also responsibility) on the part of all contractual partners, including the consumer, from prospering. He argues that “liability” is the other side of the coin labeled “autonomy” and must be applied with a broad brush, both in terms of substantive-law aspects and procedural aspects. This also extends to arbitration agreements concluded between consumers and business entities. He maintains there is no need for special restrictions when it comes to incorporating arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, and that instead, the lawmaker should focus on seeing to it that the basic principles of arbitration are observed. In concluding he finds that the European model often leads to the abuse of the system of consumer protection by the consumers themselves and that the German model represents an interesting and efficient model, striking a compromise between the restrictive system established under EU law and the U.S. model.

This paper evaluates the relationship of differing rules governing proportionality in the use of force, in jus ad bellum (law regulating justifications for resort to war) and the jus in bello (law regulating conduct in war).

It is contended that there is an overlap in the substance of the factual elements and as such the International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to consider the prohibition on the use of force.

The point of focus is Article 8(2)(b)(iv), of the Rome Statute, which obliges military commanders not to take action that is ‘clearly excessive’ to the ‘overall military advantage’ of an attack. The standard of proportionality used is troublesome to apply, as the variables used are incommensurable. In addition, as there are only rare instances of military commanders or soldiers being sanctioned the characteristics of the concept lacks clarity. 

In the absence of determinative sources to measure jus in bello proportionality, this thesis will contend that the jus ad bellum concept of proportionality can be used as a guide for interpretative purposes.

This Article explores a novel cross-national phenomenon: the emergence of a new judicial review model that merges procedural judicial review with substantive judicial review. While this model is not yet fully defined, it has already spurred much controversy. The Article explicates this emerging model, which it terms "semiprocedural review," and provides a theoretical exploration of both its justifications and its objectionable aspects. It concludes by evaluating semiprocedural review's overall justifiability and suggesting guiding principles for a more legitimate model of semiprocedural review. The Article pursues these goals through the unique perspective of juxtaposing semiprocedural review with "pure procedural judicial review" and "pure substantive judicial review."

In the liberal-democratic tradition limits on speech must be clear, precise, and subject to justification within the particular constitutional framework of a given jurisdiction. In the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Court of Final Appeal has developed a line of jurisprudence that explains under which circumstances the Government of Hong Kong may seek to limit the free speech provisions contained within the Basic Law, Hong Kong's quasi-constitution. In its fight against ‘localists,’ however, rather than legislating a clear speech restriction that is consistent with this jurisprudence, the Government has instead attempted to suppress unwelcome political speech in a different way, by pushing back against localists across a number of policy domains. It, along with public bodies and other establishment voices, has justified these actions by claiming that open avocation or perhaps even mere discussion of localism is itself automatically ‘unconstitutional’. I argue, however, that the Basic Law is essentially vertical in its operation, defining the structure and values of the Region and from there its relationship to the citizen. Thus, it is not the people of Hong Kong that are directly bound by the terms of the Basic Law, but rather the Government itself. Grinding down the edges of the expression right on the basis of this false perspective is not only wrong, it is counter-productive. Though only a tiny number of Hong Kongers identify with the localist position, an aggressive campaign against their political speech rights may serve to reinforce the perception amongst the wider population that the ‘one-country, two systems’ model is not as robust as previously believed — and thus ironically making the localists’ point for them.

One's conception of the conditions and applicability of the principle of double effect derive from one's broader convictions about moral methodology. Developed in a Catholic context which presumed the existence of moral absolutes, the principle of double effect was originally a conceptual tool to aid priests in being skilled confessors. In recent decades, as the practice of moral theology has become less connected with its earlier ecclesial and sacramental context, the principle of double effect has fallen into an epistemological crisis. Contemporary moral theological discussion of the principle of double effect usually operates in one of the following four contexts: interpretation of Aquinas; in defended within the new natural law methodology. The essay argues that juridically oriented methodologies do not adequately sustain the principle of double effect. To be sustained, it must be viewed as a theological achievement based upon the meaning of our redemption in Christ and the concomitant possibilities regarding our actions in pursuit of our true good and true end.

For its proponents, proportionality analysis is integral to a new “global model of constitutional rights”. If economic and social rights are part of that global model, a suggestion supported by recent empirical analysis, there are numerous sites on which to establish the proportionality analysis. And yet, the comparative economic and social rights jurisprudence reveals little resembling proportionality analysis, otherwise so “ubiquitous” in constitutional rights adjudication. Instead, the adjudication of economic and social rights integrates notions of proportionality in a seemingly indirect faction, through giving substance to standards of “reasonableness”,  “appropriate measures”, and “progressive realization … according to maximum available resources”.  These standards share with proportionality analysis the rejection of more content-driven, results-oriented, or rule-like conceptions of economic and social rights, such as the minimum core. But that rejection alone does not answer the question how proportionality, whether as principle or structured approach, relates to these new standards, particularly to that of reasonableness, a standard that now sets the framework for previously-absent international scrutiny on economic and social rights.

In this chapter, which is part of a forthcoming edited collection, by Mark Tushnet and Vicki Jackson, on Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges, I examine the relationship between reasonableness review and proportionality within the context of economic and social rights. Both standards hew closely to the ideal of a “culture of justification”.  Both too set out a measured assessment of the principle of proportionality, which we might summarize as the view that “the graver the impact of the decision upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the justification that will be required.”  Yet they do so under methodologies that are critically different. Part I of the paper sets out the developing approach to reasonableness review in South African constitutional law. The choice of this jurisdiction is pertinent as an early, sophisticated and influential example of the reasonableness standard, which was forged by the court in the presence of both clearly enumerated and justiciable constitutional economic and social rights, and a structured limitations clause.  In Part II, I contrast this approach with proportionality analysis, which has been deployed in civil and political constitutional rights cases in South Africa, but far fewer economic and social rights cases. In Part III, I discuss a more direct integration of proportionality into reasonableness review, and suggest what is gained, and what is lost, by this approach. A final question is whether reasonableness review, developed out of largely common law traditions, will travel as well as proportionality analysis purports to do.