Adminstrative Law

"Der Beitrag betrifft eine Klausur auf dem Gebiet des Öffentlichen Rechts auf Anfängerniveau, die im Wesentlichen das Verwaltungsprozessrecht, genauer den einstweiligen Rechtsschutz gem. § 123 VwGO, zum Inhalt hat. Der Fall ist einer Entscheidung des VG Köln vom 13.09.2011 (7 L 1172/11) nachgebildet." - juris

Sachverhalt: Rainer Wahnsinn ist begeisterter Motorradfahrer. Deshalb fuhr er bis zum Herbst 2004 regelmäßig seine
Su-zuki Haysbusa 1300
auf der Autobahn und der Landstraße aus. In diesem Herbst kam er jedoch auf der Land-straße bei 250 km/h auf nasses Laub, so dass das Hinterrad wegrutschte und er einen schweren Unfall hatte. Der Unfall führte zu multiplen Frakturen an der Hüfte, den Beinen, dem linken Arm und dem Unterkiefer.Um seine Schmerzen und den Verlust des geliebten Motorrades zu lindern, aber auch weil er sich der Reli-gion der Rasta zugehörig fühlte, beantragte er am 9. September 2009 beim Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte (BfArM) – Bundesopiumstelle – eine Erlaubnis nach § 3 II BtMG zum Erwerb von Medizinal-Cannabisblüten.Mit dem Antrag legte Rainer auch eine Bescheinigung der praktischen Ärztin Dr. Acula vom 4. September 2009 vor. Hierin wurde Rainer das Vorliegen eines chronischen Schmerzsyndroms als Folge der Unfallver-letzungen bescheinigt. Mit der Gabe von Antidepressiva habe sich keine befriedigende Schmerzreduktion er-zielen lassen. Ferner habe das starke Nebenwirkungsspektrum von Opiaten und Opioiden die Lebensqualität stark beeinträchtigt. In einer ergänzenden Stellungnahme vom 16. November 2009 machte Dr. Acula weitere Angaben zur bisherigen Schmerzmedikation und Schmerztherapie und stellte fest, Rainer gelte als schulme-dizinisch austherapiert. Mit den Antragsunterlagen wurde eine Dosierungsempfehlung des Dr. Acula vom 4. September 2009 vorgelegt, in der ein Vier-Wochen-Bedarf von 6g Medizinal-Cannabisblüten als Teezube-reitung bzw. eine maximale Tagesdosis von 0,2g angegeben wurde.Am 17. Dezember 2009 wurde Rainer eine Erlaubnis nach § 3 II BtMG zum Erwerb von Medizinal-Canna-bisblüten bis zur vorgegebenen Vier-Wochen-Höchstmenge entsprechend der ärztlichen Dosierungsvorgabe im Rahmen einer medizinisch betreuten Selbsttherapie erteilt.Da Rainer auch immer ein begeisterter Hobbygärtner gewesen ist, beantragte er mit dem Schreiben vom 14. Juli 2010 eine Erlaubnis nach § 3 II BtMG für den Eigenanbau von Cannabis in seiner Privatwohnung zur medizinischen Anwendung.Dies wurde von ihm damit begründet, der Eigenanbau sei zur Senkung der Kosten in Höhe von gegenwärtig 72 Euro monatlich für den Medizinalhanf erforderlich. Bei einem Eigenanbau entstünden lediglich monatliche Kosten in Höhe von 10 Euro. Außerdem biete der Hersteller der Cannabisblüten nur drei Sorten an, die im Wirkstoffprofil ähnlich seien. Der Eigenanbau solle auch dazu dienen, die am besten wirksame Cannabissorte zu ermitteln und so den Bedarf weiter zu senken.Mit Bescheid vom 14. Oktober 2010 wurde der Antrag abgelehnt. Zur Begründung wurde ausgeführt, der Erlaubnis stünden zwingende Versagungsgründe nach § 5 I BtMG entgegen. Insbesondere sei die Sicherung einer Cannabispflanzung in einer Privatwohnung gegen den unbefugten Zugriff Dritter nicht möglich, § 5 I Nr. 4 und 5 BtMG. Auch durch Auflagen könne eine effektive Kontrolle über den Umfang des Anbaus und der Lagerbestände nicht gewährleistet werden.Der Anbau sei aber auch zur Sicherstellung der medizinischen Versorgung weder notwendig noch geeignet, § 5 I Nr. 6 BtMG. Der Selbstanbau sei – insbesondere unter Berücksichtigung der Sicherungsmaßnahmen – nicht preisgünstiger als der Bezug von Medizinalhanf aus den Niederlanden. Außerdem sei die Therapie-sicherheit wegen eines unbekannten Wirkstoffgehalts bei Eigenanbau nicht gewährleistet. Schließlich seien schwerwiegende Nebenwirkungen, z.B. epileptische Anfälle, möglich.

Hiergegen erhob Rainer am 8. November 2010 Klage beim zuständigen Verwaltungsgericht. Zur Begründung führte er an, dass er einen Anspruch auf Erteilung der Erlaubnis für den Eigenanbau von Cannabis habe. Nach heutigen wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen gehe von Cannabis keine Gesundheitsgefahr aus. Gleichzei-tig stellte er den Antrag, ihm im Wege der einstweiligen Anordnung bis zur Entscheidung in der Hauptsache zu erlauben, in seiner Wohnung Hybride der Pflanze Hanf ( Cannabis Sativa ) anzubauen, zu ernten und zur Behandlung der Schmerzsymptome zu verwenden.

Wie wird das zuständige Verwaltungsgericht entscheiden?

Bearbeitervermerk:
Gegebenenfalls ist hilfsgutachterlich weiter zu prüfen.

PARTIES Appellant: Broadview Energy Developments Limited. Respondent: The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, South Northamptonshire District Council, Helmdon Stuchbury & Greatworth Wind Farm Action Group MATERIAL FACTS The appellant's proposal to establish a wind farm was refused in a series of events; and its implementation was challenged by a local action group and discouraged by a local MP (at [2-6] and [8]). The appellant's requests to discuss the timing and process of the appeals were rejected (at [10]); on the contrary, a local MP had the opportunity to put her statement forward to the decision maker in the lower house tea room and the lobby (at [9]). The appellant, relying on the oral and written conversations between Mrs Leadsom MP (at [9]), the Secretary of State (Mr. Pickles) and Kris Hopkins MP, came forward with an appeal that Secretary of State's stance on the matter was unfair. QUESTION OF LAW/ISSUES The issues before the court are: (i) whether the action of the respondent was in breach of his duty to abide by rules of natural justice and common law fairness and of the guidance on propriety in planning decision making (Ibid) and additionally, (ii) whether the conduct of the respondent was or was not vitiated by actual or apparent bias (at [22]); and finally (iii) whether lobbying of ministers is part and parcel of the representative role of constituency MP (Longmore LJ at [ 43] and McCombe LJ at [43] and [44]). DECISION Unanimously, (Longmore LJ at [38]; Lewison LJ at [39] and McCombe LJ at [44]) the court, to some extent, disagreed with the decision of Cranston J at first instance and dismissed the appeal. DETAILED REASONS FOR THE DECISION Their Lordships could not find it reasonable to exercise discretionary power to quash the Secretary of State's decision (Longmore LJ at [32]). Longmore LJ discussed the authorities of Kanada v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322 and Errington v Minister of Health [1935] 1 KB 249 which indicate that there will be a breach of " audi alteram partem " if all involved parties are not allowed to put their comments on the matter related to quasi-judicial decision making. Mrs Leadsom's written representations were disregarded in the present case, as no privately made representation was 'entertained' (Longmore LJ at [26]).What Lord Justices suggest is that there was a technical breach of para 4 of the Guidance, not a breach of natural justice (at [26]). Even the technical breach (Longmore LJ at [30]) and also the breach of common law fairness (McCombe LJ at [42]) occurred by tea room conversations do not suffice to quash the decision on the grounds of a breach of the rules of natural justice (Longmore LJ at [30]; McCombe LJ at [44]), because all parties Sample Case Note on Broadview Case [2016] (a requirement of UOL International programme)

The article aims to analyze the relationship between administrative simplification and the need to protect strong public interests (such as health, environment, cultural heritage), also in the light of some recent changes to the italian law on administrative procedure. After a short overwiev of the structural elements that make very problematic the relationship between administrative simplification and strong public interests in the contemporary administration, the article analyzes critically the main trends that have inspired the recent changes to the general law on administrative procedure. In the second part of the article, are examined the possible ways and methods to ensure a real simplification of the administrative decisions concerning strong public interests, expecially considering the importance of interventions on sectorial regulations: in this perspective, it becomes fundamental to better distinguish the “physiological” administrative complexities from the “pathological” ones, which may be overcome without a real prejudice for the protection of these strong public interests.

Judicial review of administrative actions is the power or process by which the High Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over proceedings and decisions of inferior tribunals or other authorities, bodies or persons charged with the performance of public acts and duties; this power is not statutory but inherent in the High Court”

Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya makes the doctrine of legitimate expectations a constitutional issue rather than a creature of the common law applicable in Kenya. The implication of this fact needs a new understanding in light of its potential impact on how discretionary power by public and private entities may be exercised.

This article examines the public safety issues raised by the Federal Communications Commission's January 2018 repeal of net neutrality rules adopted in 2015 that prohibited Internet Service Providers from blocking, throttling, paid priority, and unreasonable interference with or disadvantage to Internet traffic. This article contends that the FCC's failure to consider and articulate the public safety issues raised by net neutrality repeal renders the FCC's Order arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and in violation of the FCC’s duties under the Communications Act. This article theorizes that public safety is improved when everyone has access to an open and neutral Internet to send and receive information. Telecommunications theorists recognize that communications networks, whether the telephone system or the Internet, are more valuable when everyone can communicate to everyone. This article theorizes that the Internet supports distributed public safety; community-enabled public safety that harnesses the Internet's network effects to improve public safety through information exchange.  For example, public sharing of videos of a fire when it first breaks out helps first responders and can guide neighbors to evacuation routes. Public use of an open and neutral Internet facilitates and complements the work of government agencies and firms with statutory and regulatory public safety duties. This article explores theories of democracy that underlie distributed public safety enabled through an open and neutral Internet. This article concludes that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals should find that the FCC’s violations of the Communications Act and APA merit remand and vacatur of the FCC's 2018 net neutrality repeal order.

“In terms of its result and the reasons advanced by the judges, however, Williams v Roffey would seem to permit any variation of a contract,.. “
Per Mr. Justice Donaldson Q.C., (1) Adam opel GMBH (2) Renault S.A v. Mitras Automotive (uk) limited, [2008] EWHC 3205 (QB)
In light of the above quote, discuss how the doctrine of consideration has been affected by the development of a clear doctrine of economic duress.

Federal agencies are deeply involved in both the foreground and shadows of legislative drafting. In the foreground, agencies draft the substantive legislation the Administration desires to submit to Congress. In the shadows, agencies provide confidential “technical drafting assistance” on legislation that originates with congressional staffers. This technical drafting assistance provides Congress with agency expertise on the subject matter, which helps Congress avoid considering legislation that would unnecessarily disrupt the current statutory scheme. It also allows the agency to play an active—yet opaque—role in drafting legislation from the very early stages. In fact, the empirical findings presented in this Article, based on extensive interviews and surveys at some twenty federal agencies, suggest that agencies provide technical drafting assistance on the vast majority of proposed legislation that directly affects them and on most legislation that gets enacted.

The underexplored yet widespread practice of legislating in the shadows has important implications for administrative law theory and doctrine, as well as the conventional principal–agent bureaucratic model. On one hand, this phenomenon perhaps supports the growing scholarly call that agencies should be allowed to engage in more purposivist interpretation (than their judicial counterparts) because of their expertise in legislative history and purpose as well as their role in statutory drafting. On the other, this phenomenon may cast some doubt on the foundations for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations. Agencies are usually intimately involved in drafting legislation that ultimately delegates—to themselves—the authority to interpret that very legislation. In other words, many of the criticisms of agency self-delegation raised against Auer deference could apply with some force to Chevron deference as well. At the very least, scholars should consider more closely the administrative state’s role in drafting legislation—especially drafting legislation in the shadows—when evaluating the level of deference courts should give to agency statutory interpretations. Such reconsideration is particularly warranted given the lack of transparency implicated by legislating in the shadows.

Il contributo mira a ricostruire l’istituto dell’appellabilità avverso il decreto
cautelare monocratico ex art. 56 c.p.a. Nonostante la chiarezza della disposizione (che lo definisce “non impugnabile), la giurisprudenza ne ha ridefinito i contorni, ammettendo l’appellabilità nei casi in cui si realizzi una lesione dei diritti costituzionalmente garantiti. Due decreti del Consigli di Stato, emanati durante l’emergenza sanitaria, possono aiutare a comprendere meglio l’applicazione della lettura costituzionalmente orientata che la giurisprudenza sta fornendo dell’art. 56 c.p.a., anche alla luce del principio di effettività della tutela.

Η παρούσα διάλεξη δόθηκε στο πλαίσιο του 2ου Συνεδρίου Νομικού Σώματος Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων σε συνεργασία με το Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο στις 12 Νοεμβρίου 2019. Αντικείμενο της αποτελεί η επισήμανση ορισμένων πτυχών, που συνδέονται με την διαδικασία της νομοθετικής εξουσιοδότησης, όπως αυτές έχουν αναδειχθεί από την πρόσφατη νομολογία των διοικητικών δικαστηρίων. Το εισαγωγικό τμήμα αφορά στην επισκόπηση των βασικών χαρακτηριστικών της διαδικασίας. Στο κυρίως μέρος της εισήγησης αναλύονται ως ένα βαθμό κάποια χαρακτηριστικά νομολογιακά παραδείγματα, στα οποία γίνεται  σχολιασμός των δικαστηρίων ως προς της ακολουθούμενη από τα διοικητικά όργανα διαδικασία στην πράξη. Μεταξύ των ζητημάτων αυτών συγκαταλέγονται ο ειδικός και ορισμένος χαρακτήρας ως αναγκαίο χαρακτηριστικό, η τήρηση ή μη του εξουσιοδοτικού εύρους καθώς και ο χαρακτήρας των προθεσμιών υλοποίησης της κανονιστικής δράσης εκ μέρους της διοίκησης. Η ηλεκτρονική έκδοση του συνόλου των πρακτικών του παραπάνω Συνεδρίου, όπου και συμπεριλαμβάνεται η εν λόγω διάλεξη, βρίσκεται δημοσιευμένη και μπορεί να αναζητηθεί στον επίσημο διαδικτυακό τόπο της Διεύθυνσης Νομικού Σώματος. www.stratologia.gr

Public authorities are to maintain assurance of their acts, thereby preserve the reasonable expectation of the people.  Such assurance has given the natal to the doctrine of ‘Legitimate Expectation’. Therefore, the legitimate expectation of the individual towards the decisions of the public authorities has been engineered prior to the conduct of them which creates and enhances uniformity and certainty of their decisions. Accordingly, people have faith in Legal certainty as a basic tenant of the rule of law and they plan their lives and get the knowledge about the legal consequences of their actions. Further, good administration system requires to uphold its promises made by expression or practice and protect the justice in the case of violation of such legal right and liberty and interest of the people. Legitimate Expectation arises when administrative authorities exercising certain policies, practices, and exercising of its discretionary power. According to Wade & Frosty, aggravated parties have the right to seek legitimately expected benefits by placing trust in the promises of the official that were violated or denied. Therefore, it is unfair to dash or deny legitimate expectations of the aggrieved parties without granting them an opportunity of representation and to convey authority why desecration should be fulfilled their expectation. Therefore, public authorities and decision-makers must be aware to protect the legitimate expectations of the people as it is a mature tool to decide fair exercising of discretion power of the public authority at the court of law.

Although a maxim of statutory drafting is to identify the relevant audience and draft so that the audience can "get the message," conventional theories of statutory interpretation often overlook important considerations about how statutes communicate and delegate to a diverse range of intended audiences. Statutes exist to change the conduct and behavior of many kinds of intended audiences, including administrative agencies, state and local governments, law enforcement officers, corporations, interest groups, lawyers, and laypeople. Influenced by lessons from the philosophies of law and language, this Article contends that judicial statutory interpretation serves an important yet underappreciated role in providing a legal grammar for how other legal audiences are expected by law to understand, implement, and conform their conduct to the law. If so, then prevailing judicial methods of interpretation may not be equally suitable for all statutory audiences. This is because diverse audiences have distinct roles, interests, and capabilities, and statutes communicate to, and alter the conduct of, relevant audiences in very different ways. Some statutes set out specific rules that apply directly to the conduct of lay audiences, others conscript qualified third parties to transmit legal knowledge to affected members of the public, and others furnish open-ended mandates for governmental audiences to implement through subsequent regulation and enforcement. Yet dominant interpretive theories like textualism and purposivism often seem to treat judges as the chief audience for statutes, and therefore call for the same methods of interpretation regardless of the statute or its intended audience(s).

This Article argues that considerations of statutory audience and canons and methods of interpretation are necessarily linked, and it offers the first extensive account of the relationship between judicial statutory interpretation methodology and statutory audience. This ambit is both descriptive and normative. Descriptively, this Article identifies the subtle ways in which courts already implicitly, if inconsistently, seem influenced by statutory audience considerations. Courts invoke substantive canons of interpretation that can be understood in part as audience canons: the rule of lenity (for laypeople), interpretive deference (for administrative agencies), clear notice rules (for states as Spending Clause counterparties), and mistake-of-law defenses (for deficient taxpayers but not criminal defendants). These substantive judicial doctrines recognize that statutes communicate to, and alter the behavior of, different audiences in distinctive ways. Yet when it comes to choices of interpretive methods, courts often employ onesize-fits-all approaches to interpretation, drawing (or not drawing) on the same preferred semantic and syntactic canons of construction, evidence of linguistic usage, and other sources of statutory meaning regardless of the statute or its audience(s). Courts do so even when this approach may undermine both the normative goals that motivate audience-oriented substantive doctrines as well as the efficacy of the statutory scheme itself.

Normatively, this Article contends that many disagreements in statutory interpretation may be attributed to conflicts in prioritizing competing statutory audiences, because many statutes are directed at multiple and distinct audiences. To demonstrate this, this Article revisits prominent statutory interpretation cases in financial fraud, environmental, and civil rights law from the standpoint of statutory audience. Viewed through this lens, canonical statutory interpretation debates that typically register as disputes about method can also be understood as disagreements about audience. Indeed, judicial opinions often seem written with distinct (and conflicting) statutory audiences in mind. This Article concludes that explicitly addressing audience considerations in interpretation can highlight the important normative stakes of statutory interpretation theory; enhance the efficacy of statutes; offer lessons for legislative and regulatory drafting; and may even provide a way forward beyond debates between textualism and purposivism.

The Indian penal Code 1860 under section 82 and 83 provides absolute and qualified immunity to children of certain age group. The child rights convention 1989, provided that children in conflict with law shall be treated with respect and dignity. In order to give effect to the provisions of Childs Rights convention Indian Parliament passed Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 2000. This act provided that the Juvenile under the age of 18 years shall not be tried as adult but shall be produced before Juvenile Justice Board. The maximum punishment provided under the act is sentence for 3 years in correctional home irrespective of the offence committed. However due to increased crime rate among juvenile. The involvement of Juveniles in heinous and gruesome crimes compelled the government to come with a new bill to replace the old Juvenile Justice Act 2000. In this Paper Author has analyzed the provisions of 2014 bill with Comparison to Juvenile Justice Act 2000, and deliberated on constitutionality of said provisions of the Act.

In OCA IPI No. 10-2335-MTJ, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended for the dismissal of two (2) complaints against Judge Eliza B. Yu for Graft and Corruption, Knowingly Rendering Unjust Decision, Gross Ignorance of the Law approved by the Supreme Court on April 25, 2012. That gave her 2 wins and 0 loss in administrative cases.
Still she filed her Motion for Reconsideration as a Winning Judge in Administrative Cases due to legal errors on the issue of demand letter and issue waiver of counsel on collection suit.

Die „current Good Manufacturing Practice“ (cGMP) der Food and Drug Administration (FDA) stellt bei der Herstellung von Arzneimitteln eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung dar. Die Herstellung erfolgt häufig durch pharmazeutische Unternehmen, die die Herstellung ihrerseits an Subunternehmen auslagern. Da pharmazeutische Produkte mit Risiken verbunden sind, genießt die Sicherung ihrer Herstellungsqualität oberste Priorität. Vor allem in den USA hat die amerikanische Zulassungsbehörde FDA die sog. Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) – die „Gute Herstellungspraxis“ – als Regelungspraxis etabliert. Im Folgenden soll erläutert werden welche rechtliche Wirkung diese Regeln entfalten.

Introduction

The European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) is currently considering a proposal from the General Court (‘GC’) to permit, for the first time, the use of classified and sensitive evidence in actions for annulment at the Luxembourg Court. President Skouris has confirmed that the Court intends to ‘propose a series of amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court in the near future’, but that ’the precise amendments to be proposed is still a matter of internal discussion within the Institution and that no decisions have yet been taken’.  These proposals are yet to be enunciated, published, or publicly consulted on. They have, though, reportedly been discussed with Member States, the European Council and the Commission. The need for specific procedures has been anticipated by the GC and ECJ for some time, with Advocate General Sharpston in 2011 discussing both the need for a scheme and the possible introduction of a UK-style Closed Material Procedure (‘CMP’) at the European Courts.

The dilemma is easy to state. A claimant either wishes to bring a claim in damages against the executive  or judicially review its actions. The executive seeks to defend these claims, but fears that in doing so it would have to disclose sensitive material which would threaten national security (usually related in some way to the risk of terrorism) and thus deems it contrary to the public interest to do so. Does the executive withdraw from the case and settle, or proceed regardless and potentially endanger public safety? Or is a via media possible, whereby the Court can see all the (sensitive) evidence, but that evidence is not disclosed to the applicant who is excluded from seeing and challenging it? Enter the CMP and its Special Advocate system whereby an advocate is appointed to represent the interests of the excluded party, but cannot communicate with that party once they have seen the sensitive material. However, proceedings in camera are, to say the least, highly controversial. A CMP requires,

‘the court not only to sit in private, but to sit in a closed hearing (i.e. a hearing at which the court considers the material and hears submissions about it without one of the parties to the appeal seeing the material be being present) and to contemplate giving a party closed judgment (i.e. a judgment part of which will not be seen by one of the parties)’.

Thus, a CMP involves one party not being informed of their opponent’s allegations, not being allowed to see the evidence advanced, not being able to challenge the evidence except through a Special Advocate who represents their interests but with whom they are not able to communicate once proceedings have begun, and not being shown judgment to the extent it deals with protected information. In sum a CMP potentially, at best, erodes and, at worst, extinguishes every due process right imaginable. Thus ‘anybody concerned about the dispensation of justice must regard the prospect of a closed material procedure, whenever it is mooted and however understandable the reasons it is proposed, with distaste and concern’.  It is for this reason that it is both useful and desirable for a critical analysis of the use of CMPs in the United Kingdom – a system endorsed and implicitly recommended for the EU by Advocate General  Sharpston in her Opinion  – where the Justice and Security Act 2013 has made CMPs generally available in any civil trial. It is hoped that a number of lessons will be learnt from examining the UK system so that the European Court can implement a procedure which better protects due process rights.

This article is structured as follows. First, the process of CMPs in the United Kingdom will be summarily set out. Second, this system will be critically evaluated according to the extent that it accords with: (1) instrumental and non-instrumental rationales for procedural protection; (2) established common law fundamental rights, namely open and natural justice; (3) European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’) case law; (4) EU case law; and (5) the UK Government’s own rationale for introducing CMPs as set out in the Green Paper.  Third, the EU's current procedures and case law relating to disclosure of evidence, trials and giving reasons will be outlined. This will provide context and explain why CMPs are being suggested at the European Courts. Finally, lessons will be drawn from the UK jurisprudence and applied to the EU context; possible options for the introduction of the procedures dealing with sensitive information are outlined and improvements and solutions suggested.

Debate arose due to the failure of claimant states to find a final resolution of the dispute and the dispute still ongoing The Spratly Islands consist of more than 140 islets, rocks, shoals, reefs and sandbanks that spread over more than 410, 000 square kilometers of sea space in SCS. The Spratly Island are the combination of potentially significant oil and natural gas reserves, commercial shipping traffic and active fishing areas in the island's territorial waters This led to the overlapping claims from six countries such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, People's Republic of China, and the Philippines.

This article examines how public law should be revitalised in light of the increasing use of technology in government decision-making. As the recent controversy concerning the implementation of an automated debt recovery system by the Department of Social Services illustrates, the automation of government decision-making engages fundamental legal principles such as transparency, procedural fairness and reviewability. The use of technology in administrative decision-making in Australia therefore raises a number of critical, and interlocking, questions: Is Australian public law fit for purpose to protect individual rights in automated governmental decision-making? If not, what reforms are necessary and how should they be instituted? This article will consider these issues in relation to three specific areas of public law: privacy law, freedom of information, and judicial review. In doing so, it sets out concrete recommendations for the revitalisation of Australian public law so that i...

The right to protection of personal data arises where personal data requires processing, usage ad storage. It is therefore a process requiring extracting of personal data from an individual and processing it without infringing on the person's rights to protection of data as well as privacy. Contact tracing technology is used at the time of epidemics, and it is a technique by which people can be monitored to find out their interactions with a person who has tested positive for a

Az integritás tanácsadók szakmai tevékenységét az államigazgatási szervek integritásirányítási rendszeréről és az érdekérvényesítők fogadásának rendjéről szóló 50/2013. (II. 25.) Korm. Rendelet szabályozza, amelynek értelmében 2013-tól integritásirányítási rendszerek központi szereplőiként töltik be a szerepüket a mára legtöbb esetben szakirányú végzettséggel rendelkező integritás tanácsadók. Az integritás tanácsadóként alkalmazott közigazgatási szakemberek nagy hatású tevékenységet végeznek az egyes államigazgatási szervek mellett, amely hosszútávon hozzájárulhat a közigazgatás és azon belül a hatósági eljárás átláthatóságához, a szervezeten belüli és kivüli kommunikáció fejlődéséhez és a szervezeti kultúra fejlődéséhez ezeknél a szerveknél. A tanácsadók gyakorlatában számos olyan tapasztalat halmozódik fel, amelyre a közigazgatás fejlesztésének egyik legfontosabb forrásaként tekinthetünk. Ezeknek egy része az államigazgatási szervek integritásra vonatkozó jelentéseiben megjelenítődik, azonban primer jellegű kutatás segítségével azonosíthatóvá válnának azok a központi, több szerv(típus) keretében is felmerülő tényezők, amelyek fejlesztése kulcsfontosságú lehet az egyre erősebb társadalmi és központi állami követelményként megfogalmazásra kerülő átláthatósággal kapcsolatban. A tanulmány legfontosabb célkitűzése, hogy azonosítsa, értékelje a kormányzati igazgatási szervek mellett működő, korrupcióellenes és az integritás-szemlélet kiterjesztése irányába tevékenységet végző integritás tanácsadók szerepét, láthatóságát és a rájuk vonatkozó elvárásokat és követelményeket egy speciális területen, a kommunikációban játszott szerepük terén. A kutatás eredményei hozzájárulhatnak az integritás tanácsadó, mint önállósodó közigazgatási szakma szélesebb értelemben vett társadalmi megismertetéséhez és az általuk végzett tevékenység – különös tekintetettel annak szerepére, lehetőségeire és eredményeire – disszeminációhoz.

R. (on the application of MA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWHC 2213 (QB) is the latest instalment in the on-going legal challenges under Judicial Review to the Social Sector Size Criteria Rules (SSSC) – a policy enduringly branded the ‘Bedroom Tax’ by its critics and less-enduringly defended as the ‘removal of the Spare Room Subsidy’ by its supporters. The legislative change is found under reg.B13 in the amended Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 (SI 213),1 which in April 2013 introduced a reduction in Housing Benefit for those in the Social Rented Sector deemed to be ‘under-occupying’ their homes. This case note analyses the judgment of the Court.