Roman Stoicism (Philosophy)

Abstract

Il saggio intende offrire riflessioni utili a iniziare una nuova messa a punto del concetto di ambiente e paesaggio nel mondo classico e in particolare in Seneca, soprattutto in relazione al concetto attuale di 'rispetto dell'ambiente'. La lettera 89 dell'epistolario senecano, poco indagata da questo punto di vista, si presenta utile per tracciare alcune linee di sviluppo del tema sia in rapporto con l'opera retorica del padre sia in relazione con la tradizione letteraria e filosofica greco-latina.

On the one hand, Hume accepts the view—which he attributes primarily to Stoicism—that there exists a determinate best and happiest life for human beings, a way of life led by a figure whom Hume calls “the true philosopher.” On the other hand, Hume accepts that view—which he attributes to Scepticism—that there exists a vast plurality of good and happy lives, each potentially equally choiceworthy. In this paper, I reconcile Hume’s apparently conflicting commitments: I argue that Hume’s “Sceptical” pluralism about the character of the happiest life need not conflict with his “Stoic” advocacy of the supreme happiness of the true philosopher, given Hume’s flexible understanding of how one might live as a true philosopher.

Der folgende Aufsatz bewegt sich im Fadenkreuz von Rhetorik und Philosophie. Dass dem so ist, ja, sogar sein muss, entspringt gleichwohl nicht einer Laune des Verfassers, sondern liegt vielmehr nur und ausschließlich in der Logik der Thematik begründet. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (35-96 n. Chr.) war zwar durchaus philosophisch bewandert, wenngleich sein gesamtes intellektuelles Wirken um die Rhetorik kreist. Von seiner herausragenden Qualität als Berufsrhetoriker mag der Umstand zeugen, dass er als der erste staatlich besoldete Rhetoriklehrer in die Geschichte Roms eingegangen ist. Nicht weniger bekannt sind außerdem Quintilians Leistungen als Pädagoge: Schon bei der Wiederentdeckung und Neueinschätzung seiner institutio oratoriae im Mittelalter und vor allem in der Renaissance trat in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses der durch seinen universalistischen Einschlag fachübergreifende pädagogische Gehalt eben dieses Werkes. Weniger bekannt ist dabei jedoch, dass Quintilians formale Bestimmung der Rhetorik im höchsten Maß der Philosophie verpflichtet ist, was im folgenden Aufsatz dargelegt werden soll, indem seine Gedankengänge hinsichtlich Begründung und Bestimmung der Rhetorik nachgezeichnet werden. Erstens gilt es zu zeigen, dass Quintilian sich bei seiner Rhetorikauslegung an verschiedene Vertreter der Stoa anlehnt und zweitens sollen die Bausteine und das implizite Wissen, das in die Bestimmung einfließt, deutlich hervorgehoben werden. Der Grund für diese Bestimmung bleibt uneinsichtig, solange man diese nicht in den ursprünglichen Zusammenhang des stoischen Verstehens über den Menschen und die Welt eingebettet hat. Wird die Rhetorik aus diesem Zusammenhang herausgelöst, so verliert sie ihre ursprüngliche und die ihr von Natur aus zukommende Tragweite, derart, dass sie dann, herabdegradiert und entstellt, lediglich als vis persuadendi (Überzeugungskraft) aufgefasst werden kann. Was die Rhetorik jedoch in Wahrheit ist, dies kann nur dann genau ermessen werden, wenn man sie im Rückgang auf das innerste Ziel menschlichen Bestrebens beschreibt und bestimmt. Das setzt nun voraus, dass sich der Definitionsversuch der Rhetorik von einem deutlichen, d. h. philosophischen, Wissen um das letzte Ziel, auf das der Mensch von Natur aus ausgerichtet ist, leiten lässt. Die Definition der Rhetorik gründet sich somit in einem Wissen philosophischer Art. Im Folgenden werde ich zeigen, dass Quintilian bei seinem Definitionsversuch der Rhetorik genau von dieser Annahme ausging.

In this paper we will focus on the following points in Epictetus. First, we will concentrate our attention on the celebrated distinction between things up to us (eph' hemin) and things not up to us (ouk eph' hemin). Second, we will survey the distinction between the material (hyle) and its use. According to this distinction, all external things are not up to us and consequently have no intrinsic value, although, as materials for the capacity of choice, their use has value, since humans can use things well or badly. Third, we will demonstrate that the use of the materials corresponds to the use of presentations. Finally, we will present the three topics of Epictetus' philosophy: the topic relative to desire, the topic relative to impulse and the topic relative to assent, being the first concerned with judgments about things and our desires; the second, about impulses and adequate actions; and the third, about assent and persuasiveness of presentations. The knowledge contained in these three topics constitutes, for Epictetus, what we should know to make good use of presentations and, consequently, to achieve the human good, which is a capacity of choice according to nature that has at its disposal a comprehensive set of correct opinions about reality.

The paper revisits Seneca’s endorsement of wine-drinking as a remedy for mental anxiety in De Tranquilitate Animi (17.4-12). Although this locus has been often interpreted as Seneca’s endorsement of Platonic enthusiasm, we argue that Seneca does not deviate from the Stoic rejection of drunkenness (e.g. Ep. 83.9). In fact, a closer reading of the relevant Platonic texts reveals that Plato opposed physical drunkenness as much as the Stoics did. According to Plato, especially in Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates in the Symposium (220a), the philosopher may appear drunk but can never be drunk. In his footsteps, Seneca, appreciates actual wine as a means of inducing or maintaining a higher state of consciousness, a state of hyper-reality that is crucial for achieving philosophical breakthroughs. Seneca’s De Otio offers additional evidence towards this understanding of the role of wine in achieving philosophical enthusiasm.

The present paper reviews the Ciceronian translations of the word συμπάθεια, which cannot be referred to the Latin language because of its semantic complexity. The συμπάθεια, or connection amongst those parts which the universe is made of, proved to be from the very beginning an historical concept dense of meaning and which was received by Latin with some issues, both conceptual and linguistic. Starting from De divinatione, the analysis goes through the corpus of Cicero’s work looking for translations, periphrasis or even those excerpts in which συμπάθεια is just mentioned. He often uses the expression contagio naturae; other times he opts for concentus / consensus / coniunctio naturae; and eventually even convenientia et coniunctio naturae, are used to take just the most common forms. Each of them is not only a translational ordeal, but an accurate choice related to the context in which the word is used. The different translations, even though dissimilar and associated with the author’s apparent linguistic uncertainty, attest a careful lexical research of Cicero aiming at coping with the Latin translation of συμπάθεια in a punctual and as accurate as possible way. Thus the present paper is structured as it follows: it analyzes the various expressions used by Cicero, and insert them in their Latin context by confronting it, where possible, with the related Greek one. This results in a study which highlights both the already known Cicero abilities of vertere in Latin and the equally known difficulties of Latin of adapting itself to Greek’s density and meaningfulness.

Seneca's masterful application of metaphors often illuminates some Stoic technical terminology in contexts, which render them meaningful and familiar to his Roman readers. In this paper I argue that in certain instances, these metaphors are also used to organize whole systems of concepts that refer to an essential theoretical component of Seneca's philosophy. By studying the literary and philosophical context of these metaphors, I reconstruct Seneca's requirement for moral self-improvement in his Epistles and propose that his conception of conscientia or 'moral conscience'-a notion scattered throughout his writings but which, as the examination of his systematic metaphors will prove, has a consistent, identical function everywhere it appears-points to some novel rational characteristics of the philosopher's conception of the self.

The present study analyses Cicero's approaches to translating the Stoic term συμπάϑεια into Latin. In his treatise On Fate, the Roman author differentiates two types of situation in which Stoic sympathy functions. In the scientific sense, the word sympathy refers to mutual connections between physical phenomena, such as the connections between the phases of the moon and the alternating tides. In the divinatory sense, sympathy acts in the connection between a prophecy and its fulfilment, such as between the flight of birds and the start of a war. In Cicero's view, only the scientific sense of sympathy should be accepted. For this reason, in his treatise On Fate, he translates the Greek term συμπάϑεια using the Latin word contagio (Cic. Fat. 3, 5-6), since the verb tango means "to make or come into physical contact with". In contrast, he does not accept that sympathy acts in a divinatory sense, explaining the connection between a prophecy and its fulfilment as the result of chance.

Phrygia’daki Hierapolis kökenli olan Epiktetos (İS 1. Yüzyılın ortaları - 2. Yüzyılın başları) gençliğinde Roma’da Epaphroditus’un bir kölesiydi. Efendisi tarafından azat edildikten sonra Stoacı filozof Musonius Rufus’tan felsefe eğitimi aldı. İmparator Domitianus’un 89 yılında filozofları sürmesine kadar Roma’da felsefe dersleri verdi. Epirus’taki Nicopolis’te bir okul açtı ve üst sınıftan birçok Romalı burada Epiktetos’un derslerine katıldı. Onlardan biri olan Lucius Flavius Arrianus, Epiktetos’un derslerini (Διατριβαι / Diatribai, Konuşmalar) yayınladı, bu eserin sadece 4 kitabı günümüze ulaştı.

Bununla birlikte Epiktetos’tan günümüze, burada bir bölümünün (1-23) çevirisini sunduğumuz Ἐγχειρίδιον / Enkheiridion başlıklı bir metin daha kalmıştır. Türkçeye “Rehber” ya da “El Kitabı” olarak çevirebileceğimiz bu metin toplamda 53 bölümden oluşmakta ve yine Arrianus’un Διατριβαι’dan yaptığı bir derlemedir. Epiktetos’un odaklandığı temel konu, gerçekte insanın neyi kontrol edip neyi kontrol edemeyeceğidir. Buna bağlı olarak Epiktetos Stoacıların ortak anlayışına uygun olarak insanı kendini ve evrensel doğayı keşfetmeye çağırır. İnsan bu çağrıya olumlu yanıt verdiğinde, yaşamda iyi ya da kötü izlenimi veren hiçbir şeyden olumsuz etkilenmeyeceği, olan her şeyi olduğu gibi, doğal neden-sonuç ilişkileri içinde kabul eden ve sahip olduğu tek şey olarak sadece öz benliğine dayanan sağlam bir ahlak duyuşu geliştirir. Bu duyuş, Stoacıların “en yüce iyi” olarak değerlendirdiği erdemin insan yaşamındaki egemenliğinin tezahürü ve gerçek özgürlüğünün anahtarıdır.

Burada sunduğumuz çeviride temel aldığımız Yunanca metnin künyesi şudur: Epictetus (1928). The Discourses Books III-IV. Fragments. Encheiridion, trans. W. A. Oldfather, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (482-498).

La notion de prohairesis est l'une des notions centrales du stoïcisme d'Épictète. Alors que cette notion avait dans l'ancien stoïcisme une place mineure, celle d'une forme d'impulsion consistant en un « choix avant un choix », et n'avait que rarement (notamment chez Diogène de Séleucie) un sens plus large, c'est bien à l'aristotélisme qu'Épictète paraît avoir emprunté une notion de la prohairesis comme choix préférentiel étroitement liée à celle d'eph' hemin (« ce qui dépend de nous »). Mais Épictète a introduit de nombreuses transformations au sein de cette notion, l'étendant à toutes les facultés actives de l'âme, y compris l'assentiment, et faisant de la prohairesis la seule chose qui dépende de nous, et non pas un choix portant sur ce qui dépend de nous comme chez Aristote. Une analyse des différents sens de la prohairesis montre que cette notion apparaît à la fois comme une décision ponctuelle, comme la faculté de prendre des décisions, et, dans un sens plus particulier, comme le choix préliminaire d'un mode de vie ou d'un personnage. De ce fait, la prohairesis n'est pas à proprement parler une « personne morale », comme on le soutient souvent, mais contribue à la constituer parce que c'est elle qui constitue l'essence du bien et du mal. En annexe de l'article figurent un tableau synthétique des occurrences du terme dans les Entretiens et le Manuel et un appendice sur l'expression eph' hemin dans le stoïcisme avant Épictète.

This essay starts from an in-depth reading of Consolatio ad Helviam matrem 9.2, focusing on the nexus comitatus /chorus virtutum and on similar expressions by Seneca and Cicero. I take into consideration the Roman cultural and social context as well as the philosophical influences within Stoicism. Several aspects, both allegoric and iconographic, reflect the influence of an ancient tradition marked by the presence of personified Virtue. Besides, it must be assumed that the image of the comitatus /chorus virtutum, might have been employed not merely by Cicero and Seneca, but also in Brutus’ De virtute.

The post-Cold War era has provoked a revival of various implicit as well as explicit returns to Stoic cosmopolitan theory as a possible source of a normative conceptual framework for international relations and global community. This article confronts this revival of interest in Stoicism with an analysis of Cicero's constructive critique of original Stoic conceptions of the world community. Particular attention is paid to the arguments by which Cicero identifies major flaws in the Stoic outlook and establishes the validity of his alternative notion of the "law of nations." It is argued that Cicero's transformation of Stoicism issues in a more modest but more solid, as well as more civic-spirited, cosmopolitan theory.

This book presents a new annotated edition of the Greek and Latin fragments of Hecato of Rhodes, a forgotten figure of the Stoa who nevertheless played a major role in the constitution of imperial stoicism and later ethical thought, notably as the source of Cicero's treatise On Duties and Seneca's treatise On Benefits. The previous edition by Heinz Gomoll in 1933 suffered from an excessively loose criterion for attributing texts, which made it impossible to understand the role played by Hecaton in the constitution of the major ethical concepts mentioned above (duty and benefit). The aim of this work was to find a corpus of better established texts, in order to determine the possible impact of Hecato on subsequent ethics.
My results are as follows: while the Stoics who preceded him thought that virtue could be attained through the science of the good and the eradication of passions, Hecato came to specify the modalities. He calls for a search for rules of conduct that is attentive to the singularity of each situation, and attributes to each virtue a specific intellectual expertise, while at the same time bringing to light a new virtue, known as "a-theoretical", through which it would also be possible to attain the good. Because virtue is science, but also breath, Hecato sees a greater continuity between virtue and what is close to it, in particular "positive affectivity": attachment to oneself, love of others, joy. Taking up the foundations of Chryippean psychology as well as the adjustments made by Diogenes of Babylonia, Hecato's reflections on the acquisition of virtue lay the foundations for the new discipline of casuistry, and, through his emphasis on positive affectivity, he developed the tools that would form the core of Seneca's theory of benefit.
Table of Content
I. Introducing this edition (principles, status quaestionis)
II. The Fragments. Text, translation, notes
III. The Renewal of Stoic Ethics : 1. The Importance of Using a Punchy Language ; 2. Rethinking Virtues ; 3. Making room for Affectivity ; 4. Hecato praeceptor.

---
Ce livre présente une nouvelle édition commentée des fragments grecs et latins d’Hécaton de Rhodes, figure oubliée du Portique, qui joua pourtant un rôle majeur dans la constitution du stoïcisme impérial et de la pensée éthique ultérieure, notamment en tant que source du traité Des devoirs de Cicéron et du traité Des bienfaits de Sénèque. L’édition antérieure faite par Heinz Gomoll en 1933 souffrait d’un critère d’attribution de textes trop lâche, ce qui ne permettait pas de comprendre quel rôle jouait Hécaton dans la constitution des concepts éthiques majeurs précités (le devoir et le bienfait). Ce travail avait pour vocation de retrouver un corpus de textes mieux établis, afin de déterminer l’impact éventuel d’Hécaton sur les éthiques ultérieures.
Mes résultats sont les suivants : tandis que les stoïciens qui le précèdent pensent l’accession à la vertu par la science du bien et l’éradication des passions, Hécaton vient en préciser les modalités. Il invite à une recherche des règles de conduite, attentive à la singularité des situations, et attribue à chaque vertu une expertise intellectuelle spécifique, tout en faisant apparaître une nouvelle vertu, dite « a-théorique », par laquelle il serait possible également d’accéder au bien. Parce que la vertu est science, mais aussi souffle, Hécaton pense ainsi une continuité plus grande entre la vertu et ce qui en est proche, notamment « l’affectivité positive » : l’attachement à soi, l’amour de l’autre, la joie. Reprenant donc les bases de la psychologie chryippéenne ainsi que les aménagements apportés par Diogène de Babylonie, Hécaton vient, par sa réflexion sur l’acquisition des vertus, poser les bases de cette discipline nouvelle qu’est la casuistique, et élabore, par l’insistance sur l’affectivité positive, les outils qui formeront le cœur de la théorie du bienfait chez Sénèque.

The present contribution presents a complete survey of the studies on Stoicism published by the ILIESI and, before that, by the two Study Centers, LIE and CSPA, from whose fusion the ILIESI has been born. The historiographical production taken into consideration covers almost fifty years (1970-2019). This work also aims to offer a general reflection on the historiographical methodologies of the Institute.
Keywords: ILIESI, LIE, CSPA, Stoicism

Apresentamos aqui a tradução comentada de duas diatribes de Epicteto que tocam o tema da lógica, que lançam luz sobre a questão da importância prática dos estudos lógicos para os estoicos, já que, de acordo com o pensamento epicteteano, o homem, para bem agir, precisa deliberar, e a deliberação humana não pode prescindir da razão.

Ce livre retrace l’histoire de la controverse qui opposa les Stoïciens aux Péripatéticiens à propos des passions. Alors que les Stoïciens prônent un sage dépourvu de toute passion, les Péripatéticiens quant à eux admettent les passions modérées. Contrairement aux études dont la démarche consiste à reconstruire la doctrine stoïcienne au moyen d’une lecture synoptique de fragments issus de sources et de périodes variées, cette étude favorise les témoignages complets et se concentre sur les textes qui attestent clairement de la polémique entre éradication et modération des passions. Ainsi, cet ouvrage s’attelle aussi bien à l’argumentation théorique qu'aux différentes articulations de la controverse telle qu’elle émerge chez Cicéron, le premier témoin important de la dispute, Sénèque et Philon d’Alexandrie. L’approche de cette étude est à la fois analytique et historique et s’articule autour de trois objectifs majeurs. Il s’agit tout d’abord 1) d’éclairer les problématiques philosophiques soulevées ou relayées par la polémique à propos des passions à chaque époque déterminée, 2) d’élucider les mécanismes polémiques ainsi que 3) de comprendre la manière dont les identités philosophiques sont articulées à travers la controverse. La double méthodologie (analytique et historique) permet d'éclairer les fondements théoriques de la théorie des passions du Portique ainsi que d'aborder la question des acteurs, des sources, des modes d’expression de la dispute ainsi que de la terminologie à travers laquelle elle fut véhiculée à chaque époque.

Benoît Rossignol, maître de conférences en histoire romaine, nous livre ici un très beau livre consacré à la figure quasi mythique de Marc Aurèle. Sa perspective est historique et non philosophique, mais il ne fait aucun doute que les philosophes qui s'intéressent à cet empereur gagneraient grandement à le lire, voire à l'étudier en détail. Ils y trouveront en effet de très nombreux éléments, qui permettent de mieux comprendre comment la philosophie de Marc Aurèle s'enracine et se déploie au sein de l'école stoïcienne.

Arkhe-Logos Felsefe dergisinin 6. Sayısı (Bahar 2019) “Seneca Özel Sayısı” olarak belirlendi. Türkiye'deki tüm hakemli akademik dergiler düşünüldüğünde, Seneca bir dergide ilk defa özel olarak konu edilmektedir. Arkhe-Logos felsefe dergisi, bugüne kadarki nitelikli sayılarıyla antik Yunan felsefesi ile modern felsefe arasında köprü kurarak ülkemizdeki felsefe tartışmalarına katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaç çerçevesinde, dergi ülkemizde eserleri günden güne daha fazla okunmaya ve tartışılmaya başlayan Seneca'nın hem eserleri ve düşünceleri hem de onların sonraki yüzyıllardaki felsefî ve edebî etkileriyle ilgili özgün yazılar için tüm akademi camiasına çağrı yapmaktadır. Bununla birlikte evrensel bir akademik gereklilik olarak Latince aslından olmak şartıyla, daha önce Türkçeye çevrilmemiş olan Seneca'nın metinlerinden yapılmış çeviriler de değerlendirmeye alınacaktır. Son yazı yollama tarihi 10 Mart 2019’dur.

Apresentamos aqui a tradução comentada de duas diatribes de Epicteto que tocam o tema da lógica, que lançam luz sobre a questão da importância prática dos estudos lógicos para os estoicos, já que, de acordo com o pensamento epicteteano, o homem, para bem agir, precisa deliberar, e a deliberação humana não pode prescindir da razão.

The present study analyses Cicero's approaches to translating the Stoic term συμπάϑεια into Latin. In his treatise On Fate, the Roman author differentiates two types of situation in which Stoic sympathy functions. In the scientific sense, the word sympathy refers to mutual connections between physical phenomena, such as the connections between the phases of the moon and the alternating tides. In the divinatory sense, sympathy acts in the connection between a prophecy and its fulfilment, such as between the flight of birds and the start of a war. In Cicero's view, only the scientific sense of sympathy should be accepted. For this reason, in his treatise On Fate, he translates the Greek term συμπάϑεια using the Latin word contagio (Cic. Fat. 3, 5-6), since the verb tango means "to make or come into physical contact with". In contrast, he does not accept that sympathy acts in a divinatory sense, explaining the connection between a prophecy and its fulfilment as the re...

(Viva Vox-DFL / UFS) O objeto desta nota de pesquisa é desenvolver um problema e propor questionamentos quanto à teoria estoica das emoções boas e más e sua relação com a teoria estoica das virtudes e dos vícios. Pathos, que se traduz ora por emoção ora por paixão 1 , é um tema que foi abordado pela primeira vez de forma sistemática pelos estoicos. Anteriormente, Aristóteles fez um estudo e uma listagem das paixões na Arte retórica, mas sem a taxonomia que os estoicos desenvolveriam depois. Podemos dizer que as emoções são nossa primeira realidade, realidade inquestionável, pois podemos duvidar da existência das coisas que percebemos, mas o mesmo não vale para as emoções. Como seria possível duvidar, por exemplo, que sentimos raiva quando efetivamente sentimos raiva? Os estoicos compreendem as emoções como movimentos na mente, que eles concebem como corpórea. Como dissemos, as emoções para eles podem ser boas ou más. Na acepção física, emoções são boas se perfazem na mente um movimento ordenado e simétrico e são más se perfazem na mente um movimento desordenado e caótico. Na acepção epistêmica, as emoções são a contraface de opiniões ou crenças boas (corretas) ou ruins (equivocadas), sendo boas no primeiro caso e más no segundo. A ideia básica por trás disso é que o estado natural da mente humana é a tranquilidade ou a ataraxia, a ausência de agitação na mente. Assim, uma emoção ruim significa um movimento assimétrico e irracional na mente, que a desestabiliza, agitando-a violentamente. A emoção ruim, por sua associação a uma falsa crença sobre 1 A questão sobre a melhor tradução para nossa língua de pathos está para nós ainda em aberto.

From the Introduction to 'The Impact of Michel Foucault on the Social Sciences and Humanities':
'... focuses upon the problems raised by Foucault for one central problem in philosophy, the question of freedom. One traditional philosophical position argues that in order for an individual or a collectivity truly to be free there must be an absence of power relations, or at least a sufficient diminishment of them in order that freedom can be articulated fully.  Foucault's work questions this assumption and Magill examines Foucault's ambivalent attitude towards the relationship between freedom and power by situating his work within the philosophical tradition of Stoicism. For the Stoic tradition freedom is a quality obtained through certain practices of goodness and reason which are identified as a person's essential self. Foucault's work challenges this idea in his insistence that there is no essential self, only a self constructed as an effect of power by modern disciplinary technologies, and thus hampered in their ability to be a 'free self'. Magill offers a strong defence of the Stoic conception of freedom by identifying weaknesses in Foucault's account of power and subjectivity. Despite these criticisms Magill suggests that philosophical conceptions of freedom have much to learn from Foucault’s work: if we cannot escape from power, perhaps we are able to utilise the monitoring mechanisms of modern forms of power in order to create new forms of freedom. Foucault's work, Magill concludes, reminds us that philosophical questions such as the nature of freedom must be framed within a discussion of what we are, and what we might become, as human subjects.'"

The paper revisits Seneca’s endorsement of wine-drinking as a remedy for mental anxiety in De Tranquilitate Animi (17.4-12). Although this locus has been often interpreted as Seneca’s endorsement of Platonic enthusiasm, we argue that Seneca does not deviate from the Stoic rejection of drunkenness (e.g. Ep. 83.9). In fact, a closer reading of the relevant Platonic texts reveals that Plato opposed physical drunkenness as much as the Stoics did. According to Plato, especially in Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates in the Symposium (220a), the philosopher may appear drunk but can never be drunk. In his footsteps, Seneca, appreciates actual wine as a means of inducing or maintaining a higher state of consciousness, a state of hyper-reality that is crucial for achieving philosophical breakthroughs. Seneca’s De Otio offers additional evidence towards this understanding of the role of wine in achieving philosophical enthusiasm.

Cicero’s concept of natural law (lex naturae o lex naturalis) has been usually interpreted as a direct expression of Stoic philosophy. von Arnim has included Cicero’s well known characterization of natural law (De re publica III xxii 33 and De legibus I vi18-19) in his collection of the Stoic fragments as the only passages explicitely related to natural law, even if Cicero never mentions the Stoics nor alludes to Stoic sources in them. Since then the belief in the Stoic filiation of Cicero’s theory has become predominant. The circular argument at the basis of this hypothesis has not been remarked by most of the scholars. Further, there is usually a certain confusion in the different analysis that tend to make no difference between natural law (lex naturalis, lex naturae, ius naturae, ius naturales) and laws according to nature (leges secundum naturam). The paper clarifies this distinction that Cicero has carefully maintained and that differenciates the classic conception of law from the modern of natural law and later analyzes the relationship of natural law with mind (nous) and shows the Platonic origin of Cicero’s theory and points to the differences with the Stoa.

This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (lekta/dicibilia), and that this epistemology underlies his accounts of motivation, affectivity, therapy for the passions, and moral progress.  (Since Augustine thought that moral progress is effected by grace, his use of Stoic epistemology extends to his descriptions of how grace influences motivation.)  Byers elucidates seminal passages which have long puzzled commentators, such as Confessions 8, City of God 9 and 14, Replies to Simplicianus 1, and confusing sections of the later ‘anti-Pelagian’ works.  Tracking the Stoic terminology, and using his sermons to supplement his treatises, Byers analyzes Augustine’s engagement with Cicero, Seneca, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, and Philo of Alexandria, demonstrating that Augustine appropriated Stoicism with greater comparative sophistication than other religious writers.  She also shows how he moved beyond the Stoics in a number of ways by enriching Stoic cognitivism with Platonism, and she argues that he did so in such a way as to create a coherent synthesis.  This newly discovered Augustinian moral psychology has elements that contemporary philosophers and psychologists have identified as important.  Finally, Byers makes a substantive contribution to the scholarly debate concerning the chronological development of Augustine’s theory of grace, and provides a fresh evaluation of the early modern controversy about grace and free choice (Bañez vs. Molina), in which both sides claimed to be descended intellectually from Augustine.