×

Bifurcation, intermittent chaos and multi-stability in a two-stage Cournot game with R&D spillover and product differentiation. (English) Zbl 1429.91203

Summary: In this paper, a dynamical two-stage Cournot duopoly game with R&D spillover effect and product differentiation is established. The stability of all the equilibrium points is studied using Jury criterion, and then the stability condition is given. The direction of flip bifurcation is given by using central manifold theorem and norm form theory. By numerical simulation, two routes to chaos are studied through 2-D bifurcation diagram, one of which is flip bifurcation and the other is Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at period-2 point. The system will lose its stability as the speed of adjustment increases. In addition, a common nonlinear phenomenon named intermittent chaos is observed in the built model. Two types of intermittent chaos are displayed in time series plots and phase diagrams, one of which is PM-III intermittent chaos and the other is induced by crisis. And then, four types of coexistence of attractors are illustrated through basin of attraction, which are coexistence of periodic attractor and chaotic attractor, coexistence of multiple chaotic attractors, coexistence of periodic attractor, quasi-periodic attractor and chaotic attractor, and coexistence of multiple periodic attractors, respectively.

MSC:

91B55 Economic dynamics
37N40 Dynamical systems in optimization and economics
91A20 Multistage and repeated games
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Lei, G., Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation, Sci. Rep., 5, X, 17752 (2015)
[2] d’Aspremont, C.; Jacquemin, A., Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in a duopoly with spillovers, Am. Econ. Rev., 78, 1133-1137 (1998)
[3] Kamien, M.; Muller, E.; Zang, I., Research joint ventures and R&D cartels, Am. Econ. Rev., 82, 1293-1306 (1992)
[4] Amir, R.; Wooder, J., One-way spillovers, endogenous innovator/imitator roles and research joint ventures, Games Econ. Behav., 31, 1-25 (2000) · Zbl 0956.91024
[5] Banerjee, S.; Lin, P., Vertical research joint ventures, Int. J. Ind Organ., 19, 285-302 (2001)
[6] Suetens, S., R&D Cooperation in Oligopoly with Spillovers: An experimental Economics Approach (2004), University of Antwerp: University of Antwerp Antwerp
[7] Stepanova, A.; Tesoriere, A., R&D With Spillovers: Monopoly Versus Noncooperative and Cooperative Duopoly, 79, 125-144 (2011), Manchester School
[8] Zhao, K., Product competition and R&D investment under spillovers within full or partial collusion games, Lat. Am. Econ. Rev., 24, 18-27 (2015)
[9] Wang, Z., Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments, Sci. Adv., 3, 3, Article e1601444 pp. (2017)
[10] Cournot, A., Researches sur les Principles Mathematiques de la Theorie des Richesses (1838), Hachette · Zbl 0174.51801
[11] Rand, D., Exotic phenomena in games and duopoly models, J. Math. Econ., 52, 173-184 (1978) · Zbl 0393.90014
[12] Day, R., Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics (1993), Oxford University Press: Oxford University Press USA
[13] Elsadany, A. A., Dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality based on relative profit maximization, Appl. Math. Comput., 294, 253-263 (2017) · Zbl 1411.91384
[14] Tramontana, F.; Elsadany, A. A.; Xin, B. G.; Agiza, H. N., Local stability of the Cournot solution with increasing heterogeneous competitors, Nonlinear Anal.: Real World Appl., 26, 150-160 (2015) · Zbl 1329.91095
[15] Yu, P.; Lu, Q.; Xiao, Y., A dynamic Stackelberg duopoly model with different strategies, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 85, 128-134 (2016) · Zbl 1415.91199
[16] Varga, Z.; Scarelli, A.; Cressman, R.; Garay, J., Evolutionary game model for a marketing cooperative with penalty for unfaithfulness, Nonlinear Anal. Real World Appl., 11, 742-749 (2010) · Zbl 1187.91026
[17] Andaluz, J.; Jarne, G., On the dynamics of economic games based on product differentiation, Math. Comput. Simul., 13, 16-27 (2015) · Zbl 1540.91031
[18] Agliari, A.; Naimzada, A. K.; Pecora, N., Nonlinear dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with differentiated products, Appl. Math. Comput., 281, 1-15 (2016) · Zbl 1410.37093
[19] Nie, P. Y., Discrete time dynamic Stackelberg games with leaders in turn, Nonlinear Anal. Real World Appl., 11, 1685-1691 (2015) · Zbl 1188.91038
[20] Ahmed, E.; Elsadany, A. A.; Puu, T., On Bertrand duopoly game with differentiated goods, Appl. Math. Comput., 251, 169-179 (2015) · Zbl 1328.91202
[21] Fanti, L.; Gori, L.; Mammana, C.; Michettu, E., The dynamics of a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products: synchronization, intermittency and global dynamics, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 52, 73-86 (2013) · Zbl 1323.37052
[22] Fanti, L.; Gori, L.; Mammana, C.; Michettu, E., Local and global dynamics in a duopoly with price competition and market share delegation, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 69, 253-270 (2014) · Zbl 1351.91017
[23] Ding, Z. W.; Li, Q.; Jiang, S. M.; Wang, X. D., Dynamics in a Cournot investment game with heterogenous players, Appl. Math. Comput., 256, 939-950 (2015) · Zbl 1338.91092
[24] Zhang, Y. H.; Zhou, W.; Chu, T.; Chu, Y. D.; Yu, J. N., Complex dynamics analysis for a two-stage Cournot duopoly game of semi-collusion in production, Nonlinear Dyn., 91, 819-835 (2018) · Zbl 1390.91238
[25] Zhang, Y. H.; Zhou, W.; Chu, T.; Chu, Y. D.; Yu, J. N., Complex dynamics analysis for a two-stage Cournot duopoly game of semi-collusion in production, Nonlinear Dyn., 91, 819-835 (2018) · Zbl 1390.91238
[26] Tu, H. L.; Wang, X. Y., Complex dynamics and control of a dynamic R&D Bertrand triopoly game model with bounded rational rule, Nonlinear Dyn., 88, 703-714 (2016)
[27] Bischi, G. I.; Lamantia, F., A dynamic model of oligopoly with R&D externalities along networks. Part I, Math. Comput. Simul., 84, 51-56 (2012) · Zbl 1258.91028
[28] Bischi, G. I.; Lamantia, F., A dynamic model of oligopoly with R&D externalities along networks.Part I, Math. Comput. Simul., 84, 66-82 (2012) · Zbl 1258.91029
[29] Li, T.; Ma, J., The complex dynamics of R&D competition models of three oligarchs with heterogeneous players, Nonlinear Dyn., 74, 1-2, 45-54 (2013)
[30] Li, H. J., Fast and accurate mining the community structure: integrating center locating and membership optimization, IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., 28, 9, 2349-2362 (2016)
[31] Li, H. J.; Wang, H.; Chen, L., Measuring robustness of community structure in complex networks, Epl, 108, 6, 68009 (2015)
[32] Li, HJ; Daniels, JJ, Social significance of community structure: statistical view, Phys. Rev. E Stat. Nonlinear Soft Matter Phys., 91, 1, Article 012801 pp. (2015)
[33] Li, X., Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 115, 1, 30-35 (2018)
[34] Bischi, G. I.; Baiardi, L. C., Bubbling, riddling, blowout and critical curves, J. Differ. Equ. Appl., 23, 939-964 (2017) · Zbl 1375.37141
[35] Bischi, G. I.; Stefanini, L.; Gardini, L., Synchronization, intermittency and critical curves in a duopoly game, Math. Comput. Simul., 44, 559-585 (1998) · Zbl 1017.91500
[36] Jajarmi, A.; Hajipour, M.; Baleanu, D., New aspects of the adaptive synchronization and hyperchaos suppression of a financial model, Chaos Solitons Fractals, 99, 285-296 (2017) · Zbl 1375.91249
[37] Govaerts, W.; Ghaziani, R. K., Stable cycles in a Cournot duopoly model of Kopel, J. Comput. Appl. Math., 218, 247-258 (2008) · Zbl 1151.91458
[38] Agliari, A.; Bischi, G. I.; Gardini, L., Some methods for the global analysis of dynamic game represented by iterated noninvertible maps, (Puu, T.; Sushko, I., Oligopoly Dynamics: Models and Tools (2003), Springer-Verlag: Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg), 31-83 · Zbl 1072.91013
[39] Guckenheimer, J.; Holmes, P., Nonlinear Oscillations, Dynamical Systems and Bifurcations of Vector Fields, 117-165 (1983), Springer: Springer New York · Zbl 0515.34001
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.