How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? (English) Zbl 1140.91348
Summary: Assuming the IC conjecture, we show that, for any faithful scoring rule, when the number of participating agents \(n\) tends to infinity, the probability that a random profile will be manipulable for a coalition of size \(Cn^{\alpha}\), with \(0\leq \alpha< 1/2\) and \(C\) constant, is of order \(O(1/n^{1/2-\alpha})\).
MSC:
| 91B14 | Social choice |
References:
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