Stable and extremely unequal. (English) Zbl 1521.91246
Summary: We show how stability as a solution concept in matching often comes at the cost of extreme forms on inequality. Restricting our attention to aligned preferences, we show that the stable matching results from the lexicographic welfare maximization of the pairs’ welfare, starting with the best-off. We compare this solution with an alternative allocation, that although unstable, maximizes the welfare lexicographically starting with the worst-off pairs.
MSC:
| 91B68 | Matching models |
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