Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences. (English) Zbl 1508.91090
Summary: We investigate how prior-biased inferences change players’ strategic incentives and result in novel welfare implications in the canonical framework of strategic information transmission. The ex ante social welfare achieved in our model exceeds the upper bound characterized in the standard environment without prior bias. The welfare gain stems from the fact that the receiver’s prior bias weakens the link between the sender’s message and the receiver’s response without contaminating the actual content of the messages. We further show that direct communication is optimal among all possible communication protocols in the presence of a sufficient degree of prior bias.
MSC:
| 91A28 | Signaling and communication in game theory |
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