A differential game model of opinion dynamics: accord and discord as Nash equilibria. (English) Zbl 1475.91260
Summary: This paper presents a noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics with open-loop information structure. In this game, the agents’ motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others’ opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced by others, how stubborn they are, and how quick they are willing to change their opinions on a set of issues in a prescribed time interval. These motives are independently formed by all agents. The existence of a Nash equilibrium in the network means that a collective behavior emerges out of local interaction rules and these individual motives. We prove that a unique Nash equilibrium may exist in the game under quite different circumstances. It may exist not only if there is a harmony of perceptions among the agents of the network, but also when agents have different views about the correlation among issues. The first leads to an accord in the network usually expressed as a partial consensus, and the second to a discord in the form of oscillating opinions. In the case of an accord, the harmony in the network may be in the form of similarity in pairwise conceptions about the issues but may also be an agreement on the status of a “leader” in the network. A Nash equilibrium may fail to exist only if the network is in a state of discord.
MSC:
| 91D30 | Social networks; opinion dynamics |
| 91A23 | Differential games (aspects of game theory) |
| 91A10 | Noncooperative games |
| 91A80 | Applications of game theory |
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