On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1437.91311
Summary: This article extends the model of matching with incomplete information presented by Q. Liu et al. [Econometrica 82, No. 2, 541–587 (2014; Zbl 1457.91273)] by imposing exogenous restrictions on the beliefs of firms. The main result is that generically, there is always some game that contradicts the imposition of exogenous beliefs. This result complements [loc. cit.] by showing that their focus on stability for all reasonable beliefs is appropriate.
MSC:
| 91B68 | Matching models |
| 91A27 | Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games |
| 91A80 | Applications of game theory |
Citations:
Zbl 1457.91273References:
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