Qualified voting systems. (English) Zbl 1397.91176
Summary: Voting systems are defined by three components: the set of votes that individuals are allowed to cast (that is, the instructions voters receive on how to fill in the ballot), a support function (that transforms ballots into support or votes), and an outcome function (which states how to aggregate those votes). In this paper, we investigate how these components interact. To that end, we impose two requirements on the outcome functions, called support monotonicity and limited symmetry. We identify the family of outcome functions that satisfy both properties.
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