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Network extension. (English) Zbl 1250.91012

Summary: In a model of strategic network formation, the endogenously formed network is built around a pre-existing network. We envisage that the pre-existing or core network is publicly provided. Strategic network formation is decentralized: Players act in their private interest and bear the costs when adding links to the pre-existing network. We study how the pre-existing network affects existence of Nash equilibria and efficiency of Nash equilibrium outcomes: It can foster or prohibit existence of Nash equilibria. It can improve or worsen equilibrium welfare. Special attention is paid to an insider-outsider model where society is partitioned into several groups and links within a group (between insiders) are much cheaper than links across groups (between outsiders). We also present equilibrium existence results and examine the effect of Pareto optimal publicly provided networks.

MSC:

91A10 Noncooperative games
91D30 Social networks; opinion dynamics
Full Text: DOI

References:

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