An algorithm of evolutionarily stable strategies for the single-population evolutionary game. (English) Zbl 1166.91007
Summary: We study the single-population evolutionary game and construct an algorithm to find evolutionarily stable strategies. Finally, by an example, we illuminate the computing process of algorithm.
MSC:
| 91A22 | Evolutionary games |
References:
| [1] | Bomze, I. M., Detecting all evolutionarily stable strategies, J. Optim. Theory Appl., 5, 313-329 (1992) · Zbl 0795.92017 |
| [2] | Damme, E. V., Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria (1987), Springer: Springer Berlin · Zbl 0696.90087 |
| [3] | Maynard Smith, J.; Price, G., The logic of animal conflict, Nature (London), 264, 15-18 (1973) · Zbl 1369.92134 |
| [4] | Vega-Redondo, F., Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour (1996), Oxford University Press: Oxford University Press Oxford |
| [5] | Weibull, J. W., Evolutionary Game Theory (1995), Massachusetts Institute of Technology · Zbl 0879.90206 |
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
