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Equilibrium concepts for social interaction models. (English) Zbl 1086.91018

Summary: This paper describes the relationship between two different binary choice social interaction models. The Brock and Durlauf (2001) model is essentially a static Nash equilibrium model with random utility preferences. In the Blume (2003) model is a population game model similar to Blume (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). We show that the equilibria of the Brock-Durlauf model are steady states of a differential equation which is a deterministic approximation of the sample-path behavior of Blume’s model. Moreover, the limit distribution of this model clusters around a subset of the steady states when the population is large.

MSC:

91B14 Social choice
91A22 Evolutionary games
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1039 · Zbl 0839.90140 · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1039
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