O'Malley, Martin J. "Value Ethics: A Meta-Ethical Framework for Emerging Sciences in Pluralistic Contexts." In Facetten Der Ethik, edited by Christine Baumbach-Knopf, Johannes Achatz and Nikolaus Knoepffler. Würzburg: Königshausen Neumann, 2013: 71-90 , 2013
Value ethics is an applied ethics method that incorporates the structural elements of the Mutual ... more Value ethics is an applied ethics method that incorporates the structural elements of the Mutual Gains Approach (MGA) for negotiation. The proposal is pragmatic and modest in the sense that it does not require or even primarily seek significant philosophical commitments. It focuses rather on addressing “applied ethics” questions with the goal of achieving the most possible value in concrete situations. This paper reflects upon various philosophical approaches to ethics in the hope of achieving an understanding of the concept “value”, and also to argue that a pragmatic value-ethics approach has the potential to achieve the most acceptable solutions to tough ethical questions while tolerating a fair degree of philosophical pluralism. It is intended to be potentially compatible with many theoretical ethical schools, including Kantian approaches, natural law theories, utilitarianism, principle-based ethics and others. The value-ethics approach is presented here as a practical way to respect the context of pluralism that describes much contemporary ethical discourse, and also to manage the inevitable conflicts that emerge within such pluralistic contexts.
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to rigorous ethics principles, norms, and practices that
respect and protect human dignity. This essay examines the
ethics-review process judging human-subject studies using a
study of internal review boards (IRB) in German universities.
We argue, first, that existing practices are best characterized
by a scientific peer-review model and are functioning well
despite present challenges. Second, the appropriate measures
to judge this process are principles of human dignity and
human rights, together with relevant laws, codes, and
accepted responsible practices. Beauchamp-Childress’ fourprinciple-
approach (2019) warrants its general consensus
respect. Additionally, international and national ethics codes
and guides function well together with the four-principled
approach. Third, a performative analysis of review processes
aids the goal of maintaining broad public trust in psychological
research. Understanding ethics review as a peer-review
process, as opposed to merely a compliance assurance, optimally
preserves the values of academic freedom and scientific
advancement while respecting the four principles of respect
for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. The
peer-review model empowers the community of scholars to
advance in responsible ways in light of discoveries and challenges,
whereas a merely compliance function reduces the
process to a less-reflective administrative role. And fourth,
contemporary challenges to the review process can motivate
improved integration of ethics into basic psychological
research. As in medicine, psychological research has notorious
cases of malpractice; memory of those cases appropriately
informs and reinforces the review processes that insure
continued responsible research.
Legal regimen and ethical guidelines are similar in that they build upon consensus social values, without which they are both illegitimate and ineffective. Among the key insights is the obligation to not just workers and employers but also to society and the profession, i.e., to the social values and laws that share wide consensus and to the principles and standards that have established the wellearned respect for medical care.
The “International Code of Ethics for Occupational Health Professionals” (ICOH Code 2014) provides resources for an adequate ethical approach to occupational dermatology.
Divided loyalties should be resolved not by reducing health surveillance or the flow of information between medical professionals and workers but by establishing fully transparent guidelines: Medical officials should be able to attain the information they need to ensure the safest possible workplace, and workers should be assured that their rights and privacy are not violated.
Medical professionals have the duty to refrain from revealing information from employers when that revelation is a violation of workers’ informed consent or when such an action would endanger the trust in their integrity and impartiality. Workers have the duty to share responsibilities for their health as is shown in two examples (genetic predisposition, exposure to UV radiation).
a) a juridical adjudicating principle of local-law priority;
b) a moral/aesthetic aspiration to keep things local;
c) a principle of management to achieve a practical goal of efficiency, attractiveness, participation, or some other benefit.
This preface argues that the first understanding of subsidiarity is underused and yet critically necessary in present contexts. A robust understanding of subsidiarity can pave the way for a church communion that is both diverse and unified.
The wisdom and relevance of this key Aristotelian insight is immense, but perhaps not so well appreciated, despite the fact that the virtue-nature of justice remained intact as the system was adopted and developed by the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, to the modern period. My own appreciation of what it means – that justice is a virtue – continues to grow even after two decades of studying ethics. I should have learned this more quickly from David Hollenbach, SJ; a teacher whose work on the common good concept certainly covered this material. He writes precisely this in his book, The Common Good and Christian Ethics: “For Aquinas, the premier moral virtue is justice, which directs a person’s actions toward the good of fellow human beings.” Hollenbach explains the synergetic dynamism between justice and the common good fostered by our authentic engagement with the “other” – persons of diverse backgrounds and visions of the common good. Engaging the other fosters justice (as a virtue). This engagement must be characterized by the more-than-detached tolerance that Hollenbach called for in his chapter on intellectual solidarity. In my case, conversations with Muslim colleagues about the centrality of essentially Aristotelian principles of justice and moderation in Islam and Christianity allowed us to together realize commonalities and deeper understanding about rightly ordered ethical action in difficult situations. I use this intercultural experience as a case study to demonstrate the central relevance of a proper understanding of justice in conflict situations.
The present ethical and legal discussion builds upon framework of human dignity and human rights, international conventions such as Declaration of Helsinki, and guidelines such as provided by World Health Organization. We argue that RM presents great therapeutic potential that can be achieved within clear ethical and legal frameworks. These frameworks must protect research subjects, clarify the status of research embryos if human embryonic stem cells (hESC) are used, and to deal with societal impact.
Link: http://jme.bmj.com/content/39/5/e11.abstract
In their contribution, Johannes Achatz, Martin O’Malley and Peter Kunzmann describe the areas of ongoing conflict in synthetic biology that are worthy of concrete ethical consideration. So just what is new in terms of the ethical challenges facing synthetic biology? Firstly, an epistemic interest in the function and standardising of biological components and systems, whose ultimate goal is to duplicate and redesign any step that further propels synthetic biology in the direction of engineering science, as well as to integrate other ancillary sciences ranging from computer science to medicine. It follows that any creation of new forms of life and new applications, if successful, would no longer be subject to concrete gene technology regulations. Governments have assumed a hopeful wait-and-see stance in this regard, but are also monitoring developments in the field of synthetic biology, as in the case in Germany with its Central Committee on Biological Safety of the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety. Secondly, the open nature of synthetic biology and numerous laypersons conducting research in private are indeed remarkable innovations. Both represent opportunities for free and transparent science endeavours, but also entail the risk of abuse. The opportunities and risks associated with these new technologies include issues of biosafety, biosecurity, and maintaining equitable access to new scientific knowledge and related economic benefits. Thirdly, the two intuitive approaches of “bioconservatism” and “bioliberalism” can be distinguished as the most extreme positions. In the context of the ongoing transformation of bioscience into synthetic biology, there are factions that either reject such developments outright or that embrace them with open arms, with the standpoints of the various interest groups falling within these two poles. Both are incompatible positions. Nevertheless, they remain the core elements of any assessment of philosophical concept- of-life questions and endeavours to ensure the equitable distribution of both the benefits and disadvantages of synthetic biology; they are also the key points for discussions on such issues as the patentability of forms of life. Fourthly, the descriptions and assessments of synthetic biology are still in the framing stage, with the various actors determined to gain interpretational sovereignty over this new research field. The same points cited above in “Thirdly” are also the focus of the necessary social process of delineating a framework for this new research and application area of synthetic biology. In order to properly face the ethical challenges posed in these early stages of synthetic biology, it is recommended that all the different interest groups be taken into account and that a minimum of transparency be established, which will give both opponents and supporters an exact picture of the actual state of research. It is also recommended that the standpoints of the involved interest groups be fully documented, for instance through suitable discursive measures, before agreeing to any restrictive regulations for synthetic biology. In this way it can be ensured that the promising prospects of synthetic biology are implemented safely and that the related advantages and disadvantages are well understood by the general public."
The performative definition:
"Human dignity is the recognized affirmation that humans, qua humans, have a status of distinctive and exceptional worth expressed and thus discernible in law."
The performative definition helps capture the meaning contained in the principle of human dignity that is incorporated into the UDHR, the German Basic Law, and many other legal formulas and systems. Such a definition also aids in the discovery of functional equivalents to dignity for legal and ethical systems predating the UDHR. It is important to note that this performative approach does not surrender normative claims or the relevance of normative claims for the law – the opposite is the case. By “performative” what is intended here is an examination not only of the moral content of the principle, its inherent reasonableness and its coherence among other prevailing values and principles, but also a genealogical review of how human dignity has been and continues to be applied. The paper clarifies what is meant by the definition, the usefulness of such a performative approach, and the specific and necessary role of moral normativity for national and international structures of law.
Two aspects of the principle’s performative definition are especially essential, namely, the (a) action of recognition and the (b) object of recognition. The action of recognition is essential because, as an action, recognition is an historical act that occurs in a particular time and place. The act is therefore contextualized by a specific moral environment and the meaning of the act is both informed and restricted by that context. The object of recognition is essential because, despite its contextualized origin, human dignity is a claim that all human beings, by virtue of their being human beings, possess an unconditional worth. Among other advantages to this approach is the incorporation of the tension between the contingent and universal directly within the definition itself. Rather than posing a contradiction, the tension propels its utopic dynamism – such that the process of recognizing it is a process towards more justice and not merely compliance.
The five elements of the performative definition receive careful examination: Human dignity is (a) the recognized affirmation (b) that humans, (c) qua humans, (d) have a status of distinctive and exceptional worth (e) that is expressed and thus discernible in law.
to rigorous ethics principles, norms, and practices that
respect and protect human dignity. This essay examines the
ethics-review process judging human-subject studies using a
study of internal review boards (IRB) in German universities.
We argue, first, that existing practices are best characterized
by a scientific peer-review model and are functioning well
despite present challenges. Second, the appropriate measures
to judge this process are principles of human dignity and
human rights, together with relevant laws, codes, and
accepted responsible practices. Beauchamp-Childress’ fourprinciple-
approach (2019) warrants its general consensus
respect. Additionally, international and national ethics codes
and guides function well together with the four-principled
approach. Third, a performative analysis of review processes
aids the goal of maintaining broad public trust in psychological
research. Understanding ethics review as a peer-review
process, as opposed to merely a compliance assurance, optimally
preserves the values of academic freedom and scientific
advancement while respecting the four principles of respect
for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. The
peer-review model empowers the community of scholars to
advance in responsible ways in light of discoveries and challenges,
whereas a merely compliance function reduces the
process to a less-reflective administrative role. And fourth,
contemporary challenges to the review process can motivate
improved integration of ethics into basic psychological
research. As in medicine, psychological research has notorious
cases of malpractice; memory of those cases appropriately
informs and reinforces the review processes that insure
continued responsible research.
Legal regimen and ethical guidelines are similar in that they build upon consensus social values, without which they are both illegitimate and ineffective. Among the key insights is the obligation to not just workers and employers but also to society and the profession, i.e., to the social values and laws that share wide consensus and to the principles and standards that have established the wellearned respect for medical care.
The “International Code of Ethics for Occupational Health Professionals” (ICOH Code 2014) provides resources for an adequate ethical approach to occupational dermatology.
Divided loyalties should be resolved not by reducing health surveillance or the flow of information between medical professionals and workers but by establishing fully transparent guidelines: Medical officials should be able to attain the information they need to ensure the safest possible workplace, and workers should be assured that their rights and privacy are not violated.
Medical professionals have the duty to refrain from revealing information from employers when that revelation is a violation of workers’ informed consent or when such an action would endanger the trust in their integrity and impartiality. Workers have the duty to share responsibilities for their health as is shown in two examples (genetic predisposition, exposure to UV radiation).
a) a juridical adjudicating principle of local-law priority;
b) a moral/aesthetic aspiration to keep things local;
c) a principle of management to achieve a practical goal of efficiency, attractiveness, participation, or some other benefit.
This preface argues that the first understanding of subsidiarity is underused and yet critically necessary in present contexts. A robust understanding of subsidiarity can pave the way for a church communion that is both diverse and unified.
The wisdom and relevance of this key Aristotelian insight is immense, but perhaps not so well appreciated, despite the fact that the virtue-nature of justice remained intact as the system was adopted and developed by the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, to the modern period. My own appreciation of what it means – that justice is a virtue – continues to grow even after two decades of studying ethics. I should have learned this more quickly from David Hollenbach, SJ; a teacher whose work on the common good concept certainly covered this material. He writes precisely this in his book, The Common Good and Christian Ethics: “For Aquinas, the premier moral virtue is justice, which directs a person’s actions toward the good of fellow human beings.” Hollenbach explains the synergetic dynamism between justice and the common good fostered by our authentic engagement with the “other” – persons of diverse backgrounds and visions of the common good. Engaging the other fosters justice (as a virtue). This engagement must be characterized by the more-than-detached tolerance that Hollenbach called for in his chapter on intellectual solidarity. In my case, conversations with Muslim colleagues about the centrality of essentially Aristotelian principles of justice and moderation in Islam and Christianity allowed us to together realize commonalities and deeper understanding about rightly ordered ethical action in difficult situations. I use this intercultural experience as a case study to demonstrate the central relevance of a proper understanding of justice in conflict situations.
The present ethical and legal discussion builds upon framework of human dignity and human rights, international conventions such as Declaration of Helsinki, and guidelines such as provided by World Health Organization. We argue that RM presents great therapeutic potential that can be achieved within clear ethical and legal frameworks. These frameworks must protect research subjects, clarify the status of research embryos if human embryonic stem cells (hESC) are used, and to deal with societal impact.
Link: http://jme.bmj.com/content/39/5/e11.abstract
In their contribution, Johannes Achatz, Martin O’Malley and Peter Kunzmann describe the areas of ongoing conflict in synthetic biology that are worthy of concrete ethical consideration. So just what is new in terms of the ethical challenges facing synthetic biology? Firstly, an epistemic interest in the function and standardising of biological components and systems, whose ultimate goal is to duplicate and redesign any step that further propels synthetic biology in the direction of engineering science, as well as to integrate other ancillary sciences ranging from computer science to medicine. It follows that any creation of new forms of life and new applications, if successful, would no longer be subject to concrete gene technology regulations. Governments have assumed a hopeful wait-and-see stance in this regard, but are also monitoring developments in the field of synthetic biology, as in the case in Germany with its Central Committee on Biological Safety of the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety. Secondly, the open nature of synthetic biology and numerous laypersons conducting research in private are indeed remarkable innovations. Both represent opportunities for free and transparent science endeavours, but also entail the risk of abuse. The opportunities and risks associated with these new technologies include issues of biosafety, biosecurity, and maintaining equitable access to new scientific knowledge and related economic benefits. Thirdly, the two intuitive approaches of “bioconservatism” and “bioliberalism” can be distinguished as the most extreme positions. In the context of the ongoing transformation of bioscience into synthetic biology, there are factions that either reject such developments outright or that embrace them with open arms, with the standpoints of the various interest groups falling within these two poles. Both are incompatible positions. Nevertheless, they remain the core elements of any assessment of philosophical concept- of-life questions and endeavours to ensure the equitable distribution of both the benefits and disadvantages of synthetic biology; they are also the key points for discussions on such issues as the patentability of forms of life. Fourthly, the descriptions and assessments of synthetic biology are still in the framing stage, with the various actors determined to gain interpretational sovereignty over this new research field. The same points cited above in “Thirdly” are also the focus of the necessary social process of delineating a framework for this new research and application area of synthetic biology. In order to properly face the ethical challenges posed in these early stages of synthetic biology, it is recommended that all the different interest groups be taken into account and that a minimum of transparency be established, which will give both opponents and supporters an exact picture of the actual state of research. It is also recommended that the standpoints of the involved interest groups be fully documented, for instance through suitable discursive measures, before agreeing to any restrictive regulations for synthetic biology. In this way it can be ensured that the promising prospects of synthetic biology are implemented safely and that the related advantages and disadvantages are well understood by the general public."
The performative definition:
"Human dignity is the recognized affirmation that humans, qua humans, have a status of distinctive and exceptional worth expressed and thus discernible in law."
The performative definition helps capture the meaning contained in the principle of human dignity that is incorporated into the UDHR, the German Basic Law, and many other legal formulas and systems. Such a definition also aids in the discovery of functional equivalents to dignity for legal and ethical systems predating the UDHR. It is important to note that this performative approach does not surrender normative claims or the relevance of normative claims for the law – the opposite is the case. By “performative” what is intended here is an examination not only of the moral content of the principle, its inherent reasonableness and its coherence among other prevailing values and principles, but also a genealogical review of how human dignity has been and continues to be applied. The paper clarifies what is meant by the definition, the usefulness of such a performative approach, and the specific and necessary role of moral normativity for national and international structures of law.
Two aspects of the principle’s performative definition are especially essential, namely, the (a) action of recognition and the (b) object of recognition. The action of recognition is essential because, as an action, recognition is an historical act that occurs in a particular time and place. The act is therefore contextualized by a specific moral environment and the meaning of the act is both informed and restricted by that context. The object of recognition is essential because, despite its contextualized origin, human dignity is a claim that all human beings, by virtue of their being human beings, possess an unconditional worth. Among other advantages to this approach is the incorporation of the tension between the contingent and universal directly within the definition itself. Rather than posing a contradiction, the tension propels its utopic dynamism – such that the process of recognizing it is a process towards more justice and not merely compliance.
The five elements of the performative definition receive careful examination: Human dignity is (a) the recognized affirmation (b) that humans, (c) qua humans, (d) have a status of distinctive and exceptional worth (e) that is expressed and thus discernible in law.
This intellectual archeology argues: (1) that rights language was part of the German legal landscape and non-controversial in Ketteler's context, including subjective rights language referring specifically to the freedoms of individual persons. A language of rights was used and recognized by most Germans in the mid-nineteenth century, including Roman Catholics, to protect fundamental freedoms and to insure basic material goods necessary for dignified human life; (2) that Ketteler's use of rights was firmly rooted in Roman Catholic traditions of natural law, relying directly upon St. Thomas Aquinas, and was embedded in the nineteenth-century Romantic conception of the 'organic social theory.' Ketteler referenced these traditions for both corporate and subjective rights with theoretical constancy; (3) that along with natural law, Ketteler's creative articulation of rights incorporated the methodological insights of secular legal traditions of nineteenth-century German jurisprudence, especially Savigny's historical school, and that the juristic (legal) realm of discourse influenced his political discourse; (4) that in challenging the foundations of German liberalism and the absolutist elements of German conservativism, he also creatively adapted their constructive insights to strengthen his own natural law system, and that this creativity was possible because of the central importance of practical reason in his teleological natural law system; (5) that Ketteler's life, work, and implicit philosophy of rights demonstrate a continuing relevance for the natural law, and the rich potential for the church in public life."
The articles of this collection examine contemporary structures of authority in the Christian church. Scholars critically explore their own churches, looking at historical as well as contemporary discussions about authority: the conciliar tradition, secular developments, experiences of non-ordained ecclesial leadership, on to more confessional principles, rules, and practices relevant for church governance. Contributions represent the following traditions: Anglican, Old Catholic, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Methodist, and Reformed. The goal is not only to theorize about authority abstractly, but also to explore potential paths for closer ecclesial union and ecumenical action.