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Isomorphic distances among elections. (English) Zbl 07603913

Fernau, Henning (ed.), Computer science – theory and applications. 15th international computer science symposium in Russia, CSR 2020, Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 29 – July 3, 2020. Proceedings. Cham: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 12159, 64-78 (2020).
Summary: This paper is an invitation to study the problem of measuring distances between elections, for the case where both the particular names of the candidates and the voters are irrelevant. In other words, we say that two elections are at distance zero (or, that they are isomorphic) if it is possible to make them identical by renaming their candidates and voters, and we are interested in measuring how far are two given elections from being isomorphic. The study of such distances has just begun and in this paper we outline why we believe that it is interesting and what are the natural research directions.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1496.68017].

MSC:

68Qxx Theory of computing

Software:

PrefLib
Full Text: DOI

References:

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