Berge equilibrium, altruism and social welfare. (English) Zbl 07888715
Summary: Welfare and other properties of Berge equilibria are investigated. In particular, we address the questions to what extent Berge equilibrium can select from multiple Nash equilibria; can serve as a substitute for Nash equilibria; can Pareto improve upon Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, some of the recent results on the relation between Berge equilibria and Kantian equilibria are summarized.
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