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Structural interventions in networks. (English) Zbl 1533.91086

Summary: Two types of interventions are commonly implemented in networks: characteristics interventions, which influence individuals’ intrinsic incentives, and structural interventions, which target the social links among individuals. In this article, we provide a general framework to evaluate the distinct equilibrium effects of both types of interventions. We show that any structural intervention is outcome-equivalent to an endogenously determined characteristics intervention. We present a wide range of applications of our theory, including evaluating a potential new link in a community, identifying the most wanted criminal(s) in delinquent networks, and determining whether a structural intervention improves certain welfare measures.
© 2023 the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

MSC:

91A43 Games involving graphs

References:

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